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Analyze » Connective - a Nitro company » CON1786357491

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CON1786357491)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact0
Company Score Before Incident798 / 1000
Company Score After Incident798 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERCON1786357491
Type of Cyber IncidentVulnerability
ATTACK VECTORMalicious Website, Token Replay Attack, Fake Dialogs
DATA EXPOSEDeID PINs, Maestro payment card...
INCIDENT DATE16/03/2026
STATUSPatched

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Connective - a Nitro company's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Connective - a Nitro company Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Connective - a Nitro company breach identified under incident ID CON1786357491.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Connective - a Nitro company's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/connective, the number of followers: 0, the industry type: IT Services and IT Consulting and the number of employees: 8 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 798 and after the incident was 798 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Connective - a Nitro company and their customers.

Nitro Software Belgium (Connective) recently reported "Critical Vulnerabilities in Belgium’s Connective Signing Extension Exposed Millions to Fraud and RCE", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Security researchers uncovered severe flaws in the Connective Signing Extension, a browser component used by over 2 million people in Belgium for accessing electronic identity (eID) cards and Maestro payment cards.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows devices with Connective Signing Extension, and exposing eID PINs, Maestro payment card data and Electronic signatures.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Disabled risky library-loading feature, Modified PIN-token handling to prevent decryption by malicious sites and Enforced origin checks for all requests, and began remediation that includes Patches deployed in stages over 146 days.

The case underscores how Patched, teams are taking away lessons such as Risks of third-party identity and payment integrations in high-trust environments like government and financial services, and recommending next steps like Enforce strict origin validation for browser extensions, Implement secure PIN-token handling to prevent phishing and Disable unsafe library-loading features.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating drive-By Remote Code Execution (RCE)...with minimal user interaction and Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious websites to replay tokens...extract data from connected eID. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Client Execution (T1203) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating execute malicious code on Windows devices...via unsafe library loading and User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tricking users into downloading a malicious file. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating steal eID PINs...PIN phishing via fake dialogs and Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating token Replay Attacks...failed to properly validate the origin of requests. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Input Capture: Web Portal Capture (T1056.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvest card data...via fake PIN prompts and Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating extract data from connected eID or Maestro cards. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating native-looking PIN prompts...impersonating trusted banking or government services and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating extension acts as a bridge...with smart-card readers. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating steal eID PINs, harvest card data...via malicious websites. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating fraudulent document signing...under EU eIDAS regulation and Defacement: Internal Defacement (T1491.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating account takeover involving Belgium’s CSAM reporting system. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Drive-by Compromise (90%)
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (80%)
Execution
Exploitation for Client Execution (90%)
User Execution: Malicious Link (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (90%)
Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (70%)
Collection
Input Capture: Web Portal Capture (90%)
Data from Local System (80%)
Defense Evasion
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (70%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (80%)
Impact
Data Destruction (60%)
Defacement: Internal Defacement (50%)

Sources & References