Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Coinbase » METLED1PACOIOPE1778262200

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (METLED1PACOIOPE1778262200)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact0
Company Score Before Incident100 / 1000
Company Score After Incident100 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERMETLED1PACOIOPE1778262200
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORMalicious installer (typosquat domain)
DATA EXPOSEDCrypto wallet credentials, password manager...
INCIDENT DATE31/01/2026
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Coinbase's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Coinbase Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Coinbase breach identified under incident ID METLED1PACOIOPE1778262200.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Coinbase's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/coinbase, the number of followers: 1432639, the industry type: Financial Services and the number of employees: 7370 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 100 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Coinbase and their customers.

On 01 February 2026, a cybersecurity incident called "Hologram Infostealer Campaign Targets Crypto Wallets and Password Managers via Fake OpenClaw Installer" came to light.

A sophisticated infostealer campaign, dubbed 'Hologram,' has been active since at least February 2026, targeting sensitive data stored in 250+ browser extensions tied to crypto wallets and password managers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows systems with targeted browser extensions, and exposing Crypto wallet credentials, password manager data, personally identifiable information.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The campaign highlights the growing sophistication of infostealers, particularly in crypto and credential theft, and the use of evasive techniques like Rust-based malware, dynamic targeting, and Telegram-based C2 rotation, and recommending next steps like Avoid downloading software from untrusted sources or typosquat domains, Monitor for suspicious registry modifications and scheduled tasks and Use endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to detect anti-analysis behaviors.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fake installer for OpenClaw hosted on typosquat domain (openclaw-installer.com) and Drive-by Compromise (T1189) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating victims download OpenClaw_x64.7z from malicious domain. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating victims execute OpenClaw_x64.exe, a Rust-based dropper and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (T1059.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malware disables Windows Defender and opens firewall ports. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating registry autoruns (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit), Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (T1053.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scheduled tasks used for persistence, and Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (T1546.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating windows logon hijacking for persistence. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 130MB Rust-based executable padded with fake documentation to evade AV scans, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (T1497) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating scans for VM BIOS strings, waits for real mouse movement, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating disables Windows Defender during execution, and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating telegram-based droppers survive if main implant is removed. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating targets 250+ browser extensions tied to crypto wallets and password managers and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating targets crypto wallets (MetaMask, Ledger Live) and password managers (1Password). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating steals crypto wallet credentials and password manager data and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dynamic targeting list covers 201 crypto wallets and 49 password managers. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Web Service: Bidirectional Communication (T1102.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating c2 servers retrieved from Telegram channel descriptions, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating uses Hookdeck (webhook relay) to obscure attacker backend, and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating downloads six modular components from Azure DevOps repository. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating victim data routed through Hookdeck to attacker-controlled infrastructure and Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltrated via Azure DevOps and Telegram-based C2. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Drive-by Compromise (70%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (90%)
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell (70%)
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (90%)
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task (90%)
Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription (60%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (90%)
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (90%)
Indicator Removal: File Deletion (70%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (90%)
Steal Application Access Token (80%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Automated Collection (80%)
Command and Control
Web Service: Bidirectional Communication (90%)
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (90%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (70%)