Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Cloudflare » AMACLONPM1786444537

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (AMACLONPM1786444537)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-14
Company Score Before Incident670 / 1000
Company Score After Incident656 / 1000
INCIDENT NUMBERAMACLONPM1786444537
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORMalicious VS Code Extensions
DATA EXPOSEDGitHub tokens, cloud credentials, wallet...
INCIDENT DATE30/04/2025
STATUSOngoing

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Cloudflare's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Cloudflare Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Cloudflare breach identified under incident ID AMACLONPM1786444537.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Cloudflare's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cloudflare, the number of followers: 1188930, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 7336 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 670 and after the incident was 656 with a difference of -14 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Cloudflare and their customers.

Solidity and Ethereum Developers recently reported "Malicious VS Code Extensions Target Solidity and Ethereum Developers with Credential Theft", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Security firm Yeeth Security uncovered a campaign involving malicious Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extensions, disguised as 'Solidity Pro', designed to steal sensitive credentials from Solidity and Ethereum developers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Developer machines, VS Code and its forks (Cursor, Windsurf, Codium, Positron), and exposing GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, wallet seeds, SSH keys, URL credentials, 1Password MFA tokens.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Extensions removed from Open VSX.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Need for provenance checks, allow-list management, and behavioral monitoring in extension supply chains. Marketplace moderation alone is insufficient to prevent delayed-activation threats, and recommending next steps like Implement provenance checks for VS Code extensions, Use allow-list management for extensions and Enhance behavioral monitoring for delayed-activation threats.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including malicious VS Code extensions disguised as Solidity Pro, and npm package `ascii-fetcher` with malicious dependency and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including developers installed malicious VS Code extensions, and npm package executed hidden commands during installation. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including extensions executed obfuscated JavaScript payloads, and npm package used `child_process.exec` for silent execution and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), with evidence including delayed activation hours/days after installation, and developers unknowingly executed malicious extensions. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Browser Extensions (T1176) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including malicious VS Code extensions persisted on developer machines, and extensions targeted VS Code forks (Cursor, Windsurf, etc.). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including heavy obfuscation, splitting strings across IIFEs, and clean intermediate versions to build trust and Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion (T1497.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including delayed activation hours/days after installation, and evasion of short-term sandboxing. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including harvested GitHub tokens, AWS keys, wallet seeds, SSH keys, and collected 1Password MFA tokens and URL credentials and Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stolen URL credentials and wallet data. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including collected source control tokens, cloud credentials, wallet data, and sSH private keys and 1Password MFA tokens stolen and Clipboard Data (T1115) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating delayed-activation clipboard stealer swapped crypto addresses. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exfiltrated stolen data via Telegram bot, and cloudflare Workers used for payload delivery. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stolen cloud credentials could enable unauthorized resource use and Data from Cloud Storage (T1530) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating aWS keys and Cloudflare tokens stolen, risking cloud data access. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (90%)
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (80%)
User Execution: Malicious File (70%)
Persistence
Browser Extensions (90%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion (80%)
Credential Access
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (90%)
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Clipboard Data (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Impact
Resource Hijacking (70%)
Data from Cloud Storage (60%)