Rankiteo Logo
Rankiteo
Leader in Cyber Underwriting
Loading...
NEWRankiteo Cyber Underwriting Desktop - Score, price, and bind from your desktop
WindowsmacOSLinux
Download
Analyze » Cisco » CIS1774362550

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CIS1774362550)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-56
Company Score Before Incident799 / 1000
Company Score After Incident743 / 1000
Company LinkView Cisco Profile
INCIDENT NUMBERCIS1774362550
Type of Cyber IncidentRansomware
ATTACK VECTORInitial Access Broker (IAB)
DATA EXPOSEDStolen files, network credentials, and...
INCIDENT DATE30/06/2021
STATUSCompleted (sentencing)

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of Cisco's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts Cisco Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Cisco breach identified under incident ID CIS1774362550.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Cisco's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cisco, the number of followers: 7281720, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 95370 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 799 and after the incident was 743 with a difference of -56 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Cisco and their customers.

A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "Russian Initial Access Broker Sentenced for Role in Yanluowang Ransomware Attacks", has drawn attention.

Aleksey Olegovich Volkov, a 26-year-old Russian national, was sentenced to 81 months in prison for his role as an initial access broker (IAB) in the Yanluowang ransomware attacks.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Corporate networks of at least eight U.S. companies, and exposing Stolen files, network credentials, and victim data, plus an estimated financial loss of $9,167,198.19 (restitution).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Completed (sentencing).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating breached corporate networks of at least eight U.S. companies, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating initial Access Broker (IAB) activity targeting corporate networks, and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating selling access to Yanluowang ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating fBI recovered victims network credentials from seized server and OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stole data, deployed ransomware, and demanded cryptocurrency payments. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stole files from a Cisco employees Box folder and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stole files from a Cisco employees Box folder. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration confirmed in Yanluowang ransomware attacks and Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stolen data recovered from seized server linked to the gang. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating yanluowang affiliates encrypted victims data and Service Stop (T1489) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating operational disruption due to ransomware encryption. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating used compromised network credentials to maintain access and Hide Artifacts (T1564) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating chat logs and stolen data recovered from seized server. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Valid Accounts (90%)
Exploit Public-Facing Application (70%)
External Remote Services (80%)
Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores (80%)
OS Credential Dumping (70%)
Collection
Data from Local System (90%)
Data from Information Repositories (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (90%)
Exfiltration Over Web Service (70%)
Impact
Data Encrypted for Impact (90%)
Service Stop (60%)
Defense Evasion
Valid Accounts (80%)
Hide Artifacts (70%)

Sources & References