BUWEPC A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
06/12/2025
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Boston University Wheelock Educational Policy Center in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Boston University Wheelock Educational Policy Center in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Boston University Wheelock Educational Policy Center in 2026.
PRIVACY POLICY at the University of Copenhagen: https://informationssikkerhed.ku.dk/english/protection-of-information-privacy/privacy-policy/ With over 40,000 students and more than 9,000 employees, the University of Copenhagen is the largest institution of research and education in Denmark. The purpose of the University – to quote the University Statute – is to ’conduct research and provide further education to the highest academic level’. Approximately one hundred different institutes, departments, laboratories, centres, museums, etc., form the nucleus of the University, where professors, lecturers and other academic staff, as well as most of the technical and administrative personnel, carry out their daily work, and where teaching takes place. These activities take place in various environments ranging from the plant world of the Botanical Gardens, through high-technology laboratories and auditoriums, to the historic buildings and lecture rooms of Frue Plads and other locations.
About Aarhus University Aarhus University is a leading international research university covering all scientific areas with a staff of 11.000 employees and 44.500 students, the majority are post-graduate students enrolled on Master’s and PhD programmes. Aarhus University is among the top 100 universities in the world. The aim of the university is to sustain and enhance a high standard in both research and education, which has placed it among the international elite. Aarhus University was established in 1928 as a small private initiative. It has since grown to become a leading public research university with international reach covering all academic fields and address basic, applied and strategic research as well as the research-based consultancy provided to public authorities and private business. One of Aarhus University’s focus areas is talent development. An activity considered so important that it is singled out as one of the four core activities in the Aarhus University strategy alongside excellent research, world-class education and inspiring research-based consultancy. Research at Aarhus University is both organised in traditional departments under the four faculties and in interdisciplinary research centres. In addition, Aarhus University researchers engage in research collaboration under the auspices of Knowledge Management Centres with external partners such as government organisations, private enterprises, NGOs and Aarhus University’s wide range of international partner universities.
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Authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel vulnerability in N-able N-central allows Authentication Bypass. This issue affects N-central: through 2026.1.
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in ueberauth guardian allows an unauthenticated attacker to revoke a victim's session with a forged token. Guardian.revoke/3 in lib/guardian.ex decodes the supplied token with peek/1, which performs no signature verification (it only base64-decodes the JWT header and payload). The resulting unverified claims are forwarded directly to the configured token module's revoke callback and the implementation's on_revoke callback, a state-mutating sink. The sibling operations refresh/2 and exchange/4 both call decode_and_verify first, so the signature is checked before anything acts on the claims; revoke/3 is the only state-mutating path that acts on claims without verifying the signature. An attacker who knows or guesses a victim's identifying claim values (jti, sub) can forge a JWT carrying those claims, sign it with an arbitrary key, and submit it to any endpoint that funnels a caller-supplied token into Guardian.revoke/3 (the standard logout / session-revocation pattern). When the token module mutates state keyed by the claims (whitelist deletion or blacklist insertion, for example a GuardianDb-style store), the victim's legitimate session is evicted. This is an unauthenticated session-revocation denial of service; the attacker never needs the signing secret. This issue affects guardian: from 1.0.0 before 2.4.1.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ueberauth guardian (Guardian.Permissions module) allows a denial of service via BEAM atom-table exhaustion. This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/guardian/permissions.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Guardian.Permissions':encode_permissions!/1, 'Elixir.Guardian.Permissions':encode_permissions_into_claims!/2, 'Elixir.Guardian.Permissions':do_encode_permissions!/2. The Guardian.Permissions mixin installs a public encode_permissions!/1 function on every module that does use Guardian.Permissions. For each key of the supplied map, encode_permissions!/1 calls String.to_atom(to_string(k)) before any validation runs. The integer-value clause of do_encode_permissions!/2 then short-circuits straight to encoding without validating the key against the configured permission set, so a key with an integer value is interned as a fresh atom with no exception raised. Atoms are never garbage collected and the BEAM atom table is a fixed-size resource (default roughly 1,048,576 entries), so each unique attacker-chosen key permanently consumes one slot. An attacker who can influence a permission map that reaches encode_permissions!/1 (for example a permissions map read from a request body and passed into token issuance via encode_permissions_into_claims!/2) can mint an unbounded number of atoms and exhaust the atom table, crashing the entire BEAM node and every service running on it. The sibling decode_permissions/1 is not affected because it skips keys absent from the configured permission set. This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-controlled binary input. Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding encodes permission scopes by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. When encode/3 in lib/guardian/permissions/atom_encoding.ex is called with a list, each binary entry is handled by the encode_value/3 binary clause, which calls String.to_atom(value) with no allow-list check. The perm_set argument (the application's small, finite set of legitimate permission names) is discarded, so any external string flows straight into atom creation. This encoder is selected with use Guardian.Permissions, encoding: Guardian.Permissions.AtomEncoding and reached through the imported encode/3 entry point. String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that funnels attacker-influenced permission scopes (from a request body, a JWT claim, or other external input) into encode/3 therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node with system_limit, taking down every application running on it. The default encoder is Guardian.Permissions.BitwiseEncoding, which is not affected. This issue affects guardian: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.1.
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ueberauth guardian allows denial of service via unbounded atom creation from attacker-influenced binary input. Guardian.Plug.Keys derives connection and session namespace keys by passing arbitrary binaries to String.to_atom/1. base_key/1 in lib/guardian/plug/keys.ex converts any binary into the atom :"guardian_<input>", and the derived helpers claims_key/1, resource_key/1, and token_key/1 create a second atom on top of that. key_from_other/1 likewise converts a regex-captured binary through String.to_atom/1. The public specs advertise String.t() as a valid argument, so passing a string is documented usage, and higher-level entry points such as Guardian.Plug.current_token(conn, key: key) thread the caller-supplied key straight into these functions. String.to_atom/1 creates a brand-new atom for every previously unseen binary, atoms are never garbage collected, and the BEAM atom table is fixed at roughly 1,048,576 entries by default. An application that routes attacker-influenced data (a tenant identifier, header, or other request input) into a Guardian key therefore mints one permanent atom per distinct value. A modest stream of varied, unauthenticated input permanently consumes the atom table and crashes the BEAM node, taking down every application running on it. This issue affects guardian: from 0.1.0 before 2.4.1.
curl -i -X GET 'https://api.rankiteo.com/underwriter-getcompany-history?
linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
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