Comparison Overview
Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions

Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions
225 Liberty St, New York, 10281, US
Last Update: 27/02/2026
Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions partners with financial professionals around the world to connect investors to the innovative solutions, expertise and insights of Brookfield and Oaktree. From public to private markets, and across the liquidity spectrum, we aim to b...

Principal Financial Group
711 High St., Des Moines, Iowa, US, 50309
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Principal Financial Group® is dedicated to improving the wealth and well-being of people and businesses around the world—helping more than 62M customers plan, protect, invest, and retire as of December 31, 2023. Along the way, we commit to supporting the communities whe...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions







Principal Financial Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Principal Financial Group in 2026.
Incident History - Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Principal Financial Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Principal Financial Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Brookfield Oaktree Wealth Solutions

Principal Financial Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
FlatPress versions prior to commit 10be83c, contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in comment and contact forms where name, URL, and email fields are rendered without proper output encoding in Smarty templates. Attackers can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript through these fields to execute malicious scripts in browsers of viewers including administrators, or bypass URL scheme validation to inject javascript: or data: URIs.
Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 use the attacker-controlled `HTTP_HOST` request header as the authoritative source for building callback URLs in its OIDC, SAML, and logout authentication flows without any validation. An unauthenticated attacker can poison the `redirect_uri` sent to the Identity Provider, causing the IdP to redirect the victim's authorization code to an attacker-controlled server - resulting in full account takeover with no credentials required. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.
Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. In versions prior to 8.6.0, a user with only users.edit can send a PATCH to /api/v1/users/{their_own_id} and grant themselves any permission except admin and superuser — for example `assets.view`, `assets.create`, `reports.view`, import, etc. The issue is patched in version 8.6.0.
Poweradmin is a web-based DNS administration tool for PowerDNS server. Versions prior to 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 are vulnerable to CSV Injection (Formula Injection) in its log export functionality. User-controlled data — specifically the username field — is written to exported CSV files without sanitizing formula trigger characters (=, +, -, @). When an administrator exports activity logs and opens the resulting CSV in a spreadsheet application (Microsoft Excel, LibreOffice Calc, Google Sheets), any formula stored in a username is executed by the application. This can be used for phishing attacks against administrators or data exfiltration. Versions 4.2.4 and 4.3.3 patch the issue.
Fortra File Integrity Monitoring (FIM), formerly Tripwire Enterprise, versions prior to 9.4.0 may assign incorrect or elevated effective permissions to users created by the tetool import command while FIM is running, particularly when the import also creates or changes roles or role-permission relationships.