Braskem A.I CyberSecurity Scoring
08/09/2026
Access Monitoring Plan
Access Monitoring Plan
No incidents recorded for Braskem in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Braskem in 2026.
No incidents recorded for Braskem in 2026.
Berry Global, Inc. has merged with Amcor as of April 30, 2025. As a global leader in packaging solutions for consumer and healthcare products, our industry-leading innovation capabilities, global scale and technical expertise help our customers grow and meet the needs of millions of consumers every day. We accelerate the possible by redefining what can be done, constantly anticipating what our customers will need next, rethinking what is scientifically feasible and always helping our customers find the right solution to their challenges. Social Media Community Guidelines Thank you for being part of our online community and contributing to our discussions by sharing your voice. We’re happy to have you here and are committed to fostering a welcoming, respectful and engaging community. We encourage open conversation and do not pre-screen or moderate comments or messages before they are posted. However, we reserve the right to remove content that violates our community guidelines outlined below. - Off-topic or clearly misrepresents Amcor - Includes hate speech, discriminatory remarks or any attacks based on someone’s race, ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality or other personal characteristics - Misleading or deceptive content that promotes fraud or false information - Irrelevant to the conversation, including spam, promotional or trolling - Potentially violates copyright laws and/or any form of intellectual property rights - We appreciate your cooperation in maintaining a positive space for all. Thank you for helping us create a positive and respectful community.
Latest updates, reports, and threat intel affecting the global network.
Novo processo seletivo com vagas na Braskem está aberto neste mês de abril: São oportunidades para candidatos com e sem experiência em...
A remote attacker who controls a container registry may be able to direct a client's token request to a host of the attacker's choice, and disclose the victim's registry credentials to that host. This vulnerability is addressed in containerization version 0.41.0.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the djust live transport resolves the LiveView to mount from a client-supplied dotted path by calling `__import__(module_path, ...)`. The module is imported — running its top-level code (import side effects) — before the framework checks that the resolved object is a `LiveView` subclass and before any per-view authentication. The `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` allowlist that should contain this is fail-open (`if allowed_modules:` — skipped when the setting is unset, the framework default) and uses loose `startswith` matching. An unauthenticated WebSocket client (the WS handshake does not require auth; per-view auth runs only after import + instantiate) can therefore send a `mount` / `live_redirect_mount` / `url_change` frame (or an SSE mount) with `view = "<any.importable.module>.AnyName"` and cause the server to import — and execute the top-level code of — any importable Python module by name. Version 1.0.7 fixes the issue with a fail-closed resolution gate (`djust._view_resolution.is_view_import_allowed`): a client view path resolves only if (a) its module is already loaded (`sys.modules` — so resolving runs no new code; URL-routed views loaded by URLconf at startup keep working with zero config) or (b) it matches `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` on a module-segment boundary (explicit opt-in for lazily-imported views). The gate runs before `__import__` at all three sinks (+ defense-in-depth inside `_instantiate_view`). As a workaround, set `LIVEVIEW_ALLOWED_MODULES` to the narrow list of modules that contain your mountable LiveView classes. (Note: pre-patch the allowlist is `startswith`-matched and the import still precedes the subclass check, so this is mitigation, not a complete fix.)
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, djust's per-object authorization (`get_object` + `has_object_permission`, ADR-017) was enforced on the WebSocket mount and event paths but not on three other render entry points: (a) the initial HTTP GET render, (b) SPA `url_change` navigation, and (c) `{% live_render %}` embedded child views. An authenticated user could therefore view (and on some paths act on) an object they are not authorized for by loading the page directly, navigating to it via SPA url-change, or composing it as an embedded child — a classic IDOR / broken object-level access control on object-scoped views. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. All render entry points now route through a shared `enforce_object_permission` chokepoint: HTTP GET returns 403, `url_change` emits a `permission_denied` frame and skips the render, and `{% live_render %}` (eager + lazy) refuses the embed. Views without a custom `get_object` are unaffected (no-op). No reliable workaround short of upgrading. Do not expose object-scoped views through the HTTP-GET / url_change / live_render paths until patched.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, the WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `"testserver"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant — `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy). This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly. There is no known workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Users are most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.
djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, when a Django `Model` instance is assigned to a public view attribute, djust serialized it to the client with no sensitive-field denylist — sending fields such as `password` (the hash), privilege flags (e.g. `is_staff` / `is_superuser`), tokens, and other PII to the browser. Because exposing model objects to templates is a normal djust pattern, this could leak credentials/PII without the developer realizing the full object crossed the wire. This is fixed in djust 1.0.7. Model serialization applies a secure-by-default sensitive-field denylist (password/hash/token/secret-style fields and known privilege flags are withheld) with an identity-subset fallback. As a workaround, keep `Model` instances on `_private` attributes and expose only the specific fields needed, until patched.
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linkedin_id=axa' -H 'apikey: YOUR_API_KEY_HERE'
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