Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (BLE1773836674)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of BleepingComputer's Ransomware and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts BleepingComputer Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the BleepingComputer breach identified under incident ID BLE1773836674.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of BleepingComputer's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bleepingcomputer, the number of followers: 75682, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 14 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 100 and after the incident was 100 with a difference of 0 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on BleepingComputer and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "LeakNet Expands Ransomware Operations with Stealthy ClickFix Lures and Deno-Based Loader", has drawn attention.
Ransomware group LeakNet is scaling its operations by combining mass-market ClickFix social engineering lures with a Deno-based in-memory loader, reducing detection windows for defenders.
Impact assessments are still underway, so the full scope is not yet clear.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as LeakNet's shift to self-run campaigns reduces dependency on initial access brokers and broadens the victim pool. Defenders should monitor for ClickFix lures, Deno-based loaders, and DLL sideloading techniques, and recommending next steps like Monitor for msiexec commands spawned from browsers or Win+R dialogs, Detect Deno executing base64 data URLs outside developer environments and Watch for java.exe loading jli.dll from C:\ProgramData\USOShared.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating clickFix social engineering lures...trick users into executing msiexec commands and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised legitimate websites to host ClickFix lures. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating trick users into executing msiexec commands, Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deno-based loader runs base64-encoded JavaScript/TypeScript directly in memory, and Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating decoy script names like Romeo.ps1. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection (T1055.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dLL Sideloading such as trojanized jli.dll alongside legitimate Java binary, Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating base64-encoded JavaScript/TypeScript run in memory via data such as URLs, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating jli.dll placed in C such as \ProgramData\USOShared, mimicking Windows Update, and Reflective Code Loading (T1620) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating deno-based loader runs in memory, leaving minimal disk artifacts. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating kerberos ticket enumeration (klist command) and System Information Discovery (T1082) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating loader collects host details, generates unique victim ID. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating group uses PsExec following Kerberos ticket enumeration. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating establishes C2 communication through attacker-controlled infrastructure, Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating deno-based loader deploys additional payloads, and Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation (T1001.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious traffic masked using S3 buckets and trusted cloud services. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1567.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration via S3 buckets (e.g., fastdlvrss.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com) and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating establishes C2 communication through attacker-controlled infrastructure. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data encryption such as Yes (ransomware encryption). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- BleepingComputer Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/bleepingcomputer/incident/BLE1773836674
- BleepingComputer CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/bleepingcomputer
- BleepingComputer Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/ble1773836674-leaknet-ransomware-march-2026/
- BleepingComputer CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/bleepingcomputer/history
- BleepingComputer CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/leaknet-boosts-ransomware/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf