Comparison Overview
Big Bazaar - Future Retail
Big Bazaar - Future Retail
9th Floor , Future Retail Limited , , Mumbai, Maharashtra, 400083, IN
Last Update: 13/11/2025
Big Bazaar is a household name that is used synonymously with ‘retail’ in India. We represent the requirements of a typical Indian home. Founded in 2001 by Kishore Biyani, we as a retail chain operate under the parent organisation – Future Group – that holds a significa...
Indomaret Group
Jalan Pantai Indah Kapuk Boulevard No.1, Jakarta Utara, 14470, ID
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Originated from the idea to facilitate the provision of employees’ basic daily needs, a store, known as Indomaret, was established in 1988. As the store developed, the Company were interested to further explore and understand the consumers’ various needs and shopping be...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Big Bazaar - Future Retail
Indomaret Group
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Big Bazaar - Future Retail in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Indomaret Group in 2026.
Incident History - Big Bazaar - Future Retail (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Big Bazaar - Future Retail cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Indomaret Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Indomaret Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Big Bazaar - Future Retail
Indomaret Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/handler.go sendFile handler opened files using a cleaned path but derived the authorization filename from raw req.URL.Path, so a trailing slash could bypass .goshs ACL-file protection and block-list checks. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.5, the httpserver/updown.go multipart upload handler split part.FileName() on / but did not reject .., allowing an unauthenticated upload with filename .. to create a file outside the served tree. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.5.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. Prior to 2.1.4, the httpserver/server.go wdGuard handled WebDAV MOVE as a write-only method and did not enforce --no-delete, allowing WebDAV clients to delete or overwrite files via MOVE with Overwrite: T. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
goshs is a feature-rich single-binary file server for red teamers and developers. From 2.1.3 until 2.1.4, the sftpserver/sftpserver.go password handler used Username != "" && Password != "", so running goshs with -b 'admin:' -sftp and no -fkf left both SFTP authentication handlers unset and allowed unauthenticated file access. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.4.
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, HttpPostRequestEncoder constructs multipart HTTP request bodies by directly concatenating user-supplied filenames and field names into Content-Disposition MIME headers without validating or sanitizing CRLF characters (\r\n). Since MIME headers are delimited by CRLF, an attacker who controls the filename can inject arbitrary MIME headers into the multipart body part. The root cause is that neither the encoder nor the FileUpload implementations' setFilename() methods, which only check for null, neutralize CRLF characters before the filename is embedded into the header. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.