Comparison Overview
Bath & Body Works

Bath & Body Works
Columbus, Ohio, US, 43068
Last Update: 14/09/2026
We were founded on a simple idea: to make the world a brighter, happier place through the power of fragrance. As we've grown, so has our purpose and today, we help the world live more fully through the power of fragrance. We’re a team that cares about our customers and...

Stop & Shop
1385 Hancock St, Quincy, MA, US
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Stop & Shop has been around for more than 100 years. We started small, as a corner grocery store back in 1914. And we’ve grown…a lot. We have more than 50,000 Associates in 350+ stores throughout Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, and New Jersey. Throug...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Bath & Body Works







Stop & Shop






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bath & Body Works in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Stop & Shop in 2026.
Incident History - Bath & Body Works (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bath & Body Works cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Stop & Shop (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stop & Shop cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Bath & Body Works

Stop & Shop
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly clean up decode-side metadata for rejected inference requests in prefill/decode disaggregated deployments. Remote attackers can submit requests with max_tokens=0 to exhaust decode-worker memory without bound until the worker restarts.
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/nixl/push_worker.py#L162-L181
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/55677
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-memory-exhaustion-via-rejected-requests
redis-parser through 3.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the RESP protocol parser that allows malicious Redis endpoints to crash the client process through unbounded recursion on nested arrays. Attackers can send crafted RESP byte streams with repeated array headers that exhaust the V8 call stack, causing an uncaught RangeError that terminates the Node.js process without triggering error handling callbacks.
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L204-L213
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L291-L306
- https://github.com/redis/ioredis/issues/2108
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/redis-parser-through-3.0.0-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-recursion
Improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component ('injection') in Azure Cosmos DB allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Missing authentication for critical function in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.