Comparison Overview
Azadea Group

Azadea Group
P1 & P2, O14 Tower, Abraj Street, Business Bay, Dubai, 22700, AE
Last Update: 31/03/2026
AZADEA Group is a premier lifestyle retail company that owns and operates more than 40+ leading international franchise concepts across the Middle East and Africa. With over 13,500 employees, dedicated offices in every market it operates, and world-class infrastructure,...

B&M Retail
Estuary Commerce Park , Liverpool, Merseyside, GB, L24 8RJ
Last Update: 03/04/2026
B&M is a fast-growing discount retailer, operating from over 750 high street and out of town stores across the UK, with a team of over 38,000! In the UK, we offer customers a broad range of FMCG brands and non-grocery products at sensational prices. Our aim is to prov...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Azadea Group







B&M Retail






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Azadea Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for B&M Retail in 2026.
Incident History - Azadea Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Azadea Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - B&M Retail (X = Date, Y = Severity)
B&M Retail cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Azadea Group

B&M Retail
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.