Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (LEDGITMICAUDTRE1784125944)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Audacity Team's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Audacity Team Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Audacity Team breach identified under incident ID LEDGITMICAUDTRE1784125944.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Audacity Team's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/audacity-team, the number of followers: 0, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 8 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 799 and after the incident was 786 with a difference of -13 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Audacity Team and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "New OkoBot Malware Framework Targets Cryptocurrency Users with Advanced Theft Tactics", has drawn attention.
A sophisticated malware framework, OkoBot, has emerged as a major threat to cryptocurrency users, employing a multi-stage attack chain to steal recovery phrases, credentials, and wallet data.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Cryptocurrency wallet applications (Ledger Live, Ledger Wallet, Trezor Suite) and Password managers, and exposing Recovery phrases, Credentials and Wallet data.
Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.
The case underscores how Ongoing.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating clickFix social-engineering attacks and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating trojanized applications hosted on GitHub, fake Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS) repository. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating malicious Audacity installer delivered via fake SSMS repository and System Services: Service Execution (T1569.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tookPS installs an SSH service. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation (T1098) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating creates backdoor user accounts, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating installs an SSH service, and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Port Monitors (T1547.010) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating modifies termsrv.dll to allow concurrent RDP sessions. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating hDUtil bypasses User Account Control (UAC) using Windows RPC and msconfig.exe. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall (T1562.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating modifying firewall rules to enable RDP access, Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating modular payloads deployed remotely via SSH infrastructure, and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating rC4-encrypted file for locally stored seed phrases. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating harvesting browser data, Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mC Keylogger logs keystrokes, OkoSpyware records video streams from wallet apps, Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating harvesting browser data, and Data from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump) (T1602.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating system reconnaissance identifying security software. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating system reconnaissance identifying security software, Application Window Discovery (T1010) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating seedHunter targets Ledger Live, Ledger Wallet, and Trezor Suite, and Process Discovery (T1057) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating system reconnaissance. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Screen Capture (T1113) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mC Keylogger logs screenshots, Clipboard Data (T1115) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mC Keylogger logs clipboard data, Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating okoSpyware records keystrokes, and Data from Information Repositories: Confluence (T1213.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating harvesting browser data (potential stored credentials). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating establishes tunnel to attacker-controlled servers via SSH, Protocol Tunneling (T1572) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sSH tunnel to attacker-controlled servers, and Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating sSH infrastructure for remote payload deployment. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating seed phrases exfiltrated to moonsand.store and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration to moonsand.store. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating rC4-encrypted file for locally stored seed phrases and Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential loss of access to cryptocurrency wallets due to stolen recovery phrases. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Audacity Team Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/audacity-team/incident/LEDGITMICAUDTRE1784125944
- Audacity Team CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/audacity-team
- Audacity Team Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/ledgitmicaudtre1784125944-microsoft-trezor-audacity-github-ledger-cyber-attack-january-2026/
- Audacity Team CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/audacity-team/history
- Audacity Team CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/okobot-malware-uses-clickfix/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf