Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MICATL1786962683)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta breach identified under incident ID MICATL1786962683.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/atlantafed, the number of followers: 40623, the industry type: Financial Services and the number of employees: 1574 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 761 and after the incident was 753 with a difference of -8 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and their customers.
On 07 August 2024, City of Atlanta disclosed Data Exposure issues under the banner "Microsoft Power Pages Misconfigurations Expose 27 Million Records in Mass Data Leak".
A suspected misconfiguration in Microsoft Power Pages led to the exposure of 27 million records across 13 organizations after the data-extortion group ExfilSquad published 382.64 GB of stolen data via torrent on August 7.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Microsoft Power Pages, Microsoft Dataverse, Microsoft Dynamics 365 CRM and ERP environments, and exposing 27 million records, with nearly 27 million records at risk.
In response, and began remediation that includes Audit Power Pages deployments, remove Anonymous Users role from tables unless explicitly required, narrowly scope permissions, test API responses from unauthenticated sessions.
The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Cloud data exposure can be automated and mass-harvested once a portal’s API is publicly accessible, even without internal network compromise. Identity and authorization misconfigurations can turn a customer portal into an open data-export interface, exposing organizations to significant privacy and fraud risks, and recommending next steps like Audit Power Pages deployments, remove the Anonymous Users role from tables unless explicitly required for public access. Where anonymous access is necessary, permissions should be narrowly scoped, and API responses should be tested from unauthenticated sessions to prevent unintended data leaks.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating publicly readable Microsoft Dataverse tables due to overly permissive anonymous access settings and Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exposed API endpoints via misconfigured Power Pages portals. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Cloud Instance Metadata API (T1552.007) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating anonymous Users web role granted read access to sensitive Dataverse tables. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Cloud Storage (T1530) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating 27 million records harvested from publicly readable Dataverse tables and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cRM data, student records, government service records compromised. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 382.64 GB of stolen data published via torrent by ExfilSquad and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data-extortion group ExfilSquad published stolen data. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Modify Authentication Process (T1556) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exploited legitimate but misconfigured SaaS features (Anonymous Users web role) and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating anonymous Users role used to access data without authentication. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Defacement: External Defacement (T1491.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating data-extortion group published stolen data via torrent and Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating high risk for spear-phishing, identity fraud, and follow-on attacks. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/atlantafed/incident/MICATL1786962683
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/atlantafed
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/micatl1786962683-microsoft-city-of-atlanta-vulnerability-august-2026/
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/atlantafed/history
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/misconfigured-microsoft-power-pages/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf