Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GITAQU1780490516)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Aqua Security's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Aqua Security Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Aqua Security breach identified under incident ID GITAQU1780490516.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Aqua Security's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/aquasecteam, the number of followers: 66228, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 481 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 676 and after the incident was 671 with a difference of -5 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Aqua Security and their customers.
A newly reported cybersecurity incident, "GitHub Actions Vulnerabilities Expose 38% of Organizations to Supply Chain Attacks", has drawn attention.
A recent analysis reveals that 38% of organizations using GitHub Actions are running workflows with script injection vulnerabilities or unsafe trigger configurations, exposing them to significant supply chain risks.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting CI/CD pipelines and GitHub Actions workflows, and exposing Source code, Credentials and Build artifacts.
In response, and began remediation that includes Deterministic dependency management (locking actions to commit hashes), Centralized policies to restrict workflow triggers and Scoped secrets to limit credential exposure.
The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Organizations must treat CI/CD pipelines as part of the application attack surface, validate external input, restrict token permissions, and secure GitHub Actions workflows to mitigate supply chain risks, and recommending next steps like Pin GitHub Actions to specific commit hashes, Restrict workflow triggers and initiator permissions and Use scoped secrets to limit credential exposure.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating teamPCP campaign exploited compromised credentials to publish malicious versions of Trivy and KICS, Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 71% of organizations do not pin GitHub Actions to specific commit hashes, vulnerable to dependency tampering, and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious pull requests (pwn requests) crafted to execute arbitrary code via pull_request_target trigger. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating unchecked pull request titles could break out of intended commands, enabling remote code execution and Serverless Execution (T1648) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating gitHub Actions workflows automate build/test/deployment tasks with elevated privileges. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Compromise Client Software Binary (T1554) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating backdoors installed in distributed software via tampered dependencies and Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating possible backdoors in distributed software from compromised workflows. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating workflow scripts run with elevated privileges and access to source code/credentials and Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid (T1548.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating pull_request_target trigger allows workflows to run with heightened privileges. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cI/CD pipelines have access to credentials; scoped secrets recommended as mitigation and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating secret exfiltration listed as motivation in hackerbot-claw campaign. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Cloud Account (T1087.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating compromised workflows with access to source code/credentials enable further discovery. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Code Repositories (T1213.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating source code compromised via CI/CD pipelines and GitHub Actions workflows. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration possible; native egress firewall recommended as mitigation and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating secret exfiltration motivation in hackerbot-claw campaign. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating modified build artifacts and backdoors in distributed software and Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating tampered dependencies (Trivy/KICS) trick workflows into executing malicious code. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious input injected into workflow scripts to break out of intended commands and Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised credentials used to publish malicious versions of tools (Trivy/KICS). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Aqua Security Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/aquasecteam/incident/GITAQU1780490516
- Aqua Security CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/aquasecteam
- Aqua Security Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/gitaqu1780490516-github-trivy-vulnerability-january-2026/
- Aqua Security CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/aquasecteam/history
- Aqua Security CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://gbhackers.com/38-of-github-actions-workflows-exposed/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf