Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (APP1773995645)
The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.
Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of AppsFlyer's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts AppsFlyer Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the AppsFlyer breach identified under incident ID APP1773995645.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of AppsFlyer's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/appsflyer, the number of followers: 143481, the industry type: Technology, Information and Internet and the number of employees: 1518 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 762 and after the incident was 744 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on AppsFlyer and their customers.
On 11 March 2026, AppsFlyer disclosed Supply-Chain Attack issues under the banner "AppsFlyer Web SDK Compromised in Sophisticated Supply-Chain Attack Targeting Cryptocurrency Transactions".
Between March 9 and March 11, 2026, a supply-chain attack compromised the AppsFlyer Web SDK, injecting malicious JavaScript into thousands of websites and applications worldwide.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Over 100,000 web and mobile applications using AppsFlyer Web SDK, and exposing Cryptocurrency wallet addresses, transaction details, plus an estimated financial loss of Funds redirected to attacker-controlled wallets.
In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Revoked compromised SDK, notified customers, and began remediation that includes Forensic investigation, advised customers to review logs for IOCs, while recovery efforts such as Implementation of Subresource Integrity (SRI) and enhanced monitoring recommended continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through Customer advisories issued.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Need for stricter third-party SDK security, implementation of Subresource Integrity (SRI), and enhanced monitoring of trusted CDNs, and recommending next steps like Implement Subresource Integrity (SRI), enhance monitoring of third-party dependencies, conduct regular security audits of CDNs, and educate users on verifying wallet addresses, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Yes (customers notified).
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including supply-chain attack compromised the AppsFlyer Web SDK, and exploited a trusted content delivery network (CDN) and Trusted Relationship (T1199) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating leveraging a domain registrar compromise to inject obfuscated JavaScript into the SDK. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including injecting malicious JavaScript into thousands of websites, and obfuscated JavaScript into the SDK. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Browser Extensions (T1176) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious payload was embedded in the websdk.appsflyer.com distribution. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating silently monitoring user input for cryptocurrency wallet addresses. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Automated Collection (T1119) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating monitoring user input for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Ripple, and TRON wallet addresses and Input Capture: Keylogging (T1056.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating intercepted and replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses entered by users. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrating transaction details via covert HTTP requests. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrating transaction details via covert HTTP requests. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating redirecting funds to attacker-controlled wallets and Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation (T1565.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating dynamically substituted the victim’s address with one controlled by the attacker. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- AppsFlyer Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/appsflyer/incident/APP1773995645
- AppsFlyer CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/appsflyer
- AppsFlyer Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/app1773995645-appsflyer-cyber-attack-march-2026/
- AppsFlyer CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/appsflyer/history
- AppsFlyer CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.rescana.com/post/appsflyer-web-sdk-supply-chain-attack-global-crypto-stealing-javascript-injection-and-mitigation-an
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf