Comparison Overview
Airborne Global Solutions

Airborne Global Solutions
145 Hunter Dr, Wilmington, OH 45177, Ohio, 45177, US
Last Update: 07/02/2026
Airborne Global Solutions (AGS), specializes in providing operating and leasing solutions utilizing cost-effective medium wide-body freighter aircraft. AGS is a subsidiary of Air Transport Services Group, Inc. (ATSG). Through strategic alliances with the ATSG family of...

Etihad
P.O. Box 35566, New Airport Road, Abu Dhabi, 35566, AE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Marhaba! Welcome to Etihad Airways. We are proud to be the national airline of the UAE, flying to 100+ destinations via Abu Dhabi. At Etihad, we don't stop at the border of what's possible, we go beyond it. Proudly inspired by our Emirati identity, we are dedicated to ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Airborne Global Solutions







Etihad






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Airborne Global Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Etihad in 2026.
Incident History - Airborne Global Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Airborne Global Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Etihad (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Etihad cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Airborne Global Solutions

Etihad
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
GNU Savannah Administration Savane through 3.17 uses untrusted data as part of authorization.
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n113
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n123
- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48605220
- https://www.fsf.org/news/statement-regarding-gnu-savannah-security-reports
- https://www.hacktron.ai
- https://www.mallory.ai/stories/019ee445-bdd4-7775-93b5-a8faaf5c2eb7
AVideo TopMenu plugin through version 26.0 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in menu item rendering due to missing output encoding of icon classes, URLs, and text labels. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through unescaped menu item fields that execute for all site visitors, potentially stealing session cookies or performing unauthorized actions.
AVideo through version 25.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the decryptMessage.json.php endpoint that allows unauthenticated users to decrypt PGP messages. Remote attackers can submit private keys, ciphertext, and passphrases to perform server-side decryption without credentials, exposing key material to logs and enabling resource exhaustion attacks.
AVideo through 29.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint that derives the target users_id from the uploaded filename without verification. An attacker with knowledge of the Meet shared secret can craft a malicious file upload with a filename containing an arbitrary users_id to invoke passwordless User->login() and establish an authenticated session as any user including admin. Attackers can obtain the Meet shared secret through path-traversal vulnerabilities or timing attacks against checkToken.json.php, then POST a crafted file to uploadRecordedVideo.json.php with a filename like '1-anything.mp4' to hijack admin sessions and gain full account takeover.
AVideo through version 27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php that allows authenticated administrators to read arbitrary URLs via the statsURL parameter, which lacks isSSRFSafeURL() validation and accepts requests to private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Attackers can exploit this by crafting requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254, and localhost to retrieve sensitive information including IAM credentials, internal service responses, and network configuration details.