Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (AGR1770850632)
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Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis
Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis
- Timeline of Agree.com's Vulnerability and lateral movement inside company's environment.
- Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
- How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
- How this cyber incident impacts Agree.com Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
- Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.
Full Incident Analysis Transcript
In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Agree.com breach identified under incident ID AGR1770850632.
The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Agree.com's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/agreehq, the number of followers: 5534, the industry type: Technology, Information and Internet and the number of employees: 14 employees
After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 764 and after the incident was 746 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.
In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Agree.com and their customers.
Microsoft recently reported "Malicious AgreeTo Outlook Add-In Hijacked to Steal 4,000 Microsoft Credentials", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.
A legitimate Outlook add-in, AgreeTo, was hijacked by threat actors and repurposed as a phishing kit, resulting in the theft of over 4,000 Microsoft account credentials, along with credit card details and banking security answers.
The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Microsoft Outlook with AgreeTo add-in installed, and exposing 4,000+ Microsoft account credentials, credit card details, banking security answers, with nearly 4,000+ records at risk.
In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Removal of the malicious add-in from Microsoft’s Office Add-in Store.
The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Microsoft’s add-in review process failed to detect the compromise due to reliance on initial manifest verification. Abandoned projects with vulnerable dependencies pose significant supply-chain risks. Enhanced monitoring of third-party dependencies and post-approval reviews are necessary to prevent similar incidents, and recommending next steps like Implement continuous monitoring of add-ins post-approval to detect malicious updates, Enforce stricter controls on abandoned projects and third-party dependencies and Enhance user awareness of phishing risks associated with Office add-ins.
Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.
MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis
Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including a legitimate Outlook add-in...was hijacked by threat actors, and abandoned Vercel-hosted URL takeover and Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fake Microsoft sign-in page...tricking users into entering their credentials. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious add-in displayed a convincing phishing prompt in Outlook’s sidebar. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Input Capture: Web Portal Capture (T1056.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating credential harvesting script...fake Microsoft sign-in page and Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay (T1557.001) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of network poisoning, but phishing implies potential MitM risks. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Email Collection: Local Email Collection (T1114.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating add-in retained ReadWriteItem permissions, allowing it to access user emails and Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating credit card details and banking security answers compromised. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen data was transmitted via a Telegram bot API. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing (T1553.006) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating legitimate add-in repurposed...retained ReadWriteItem permissions and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fake Microsoft sign-in page...redirected to the real Microsoft login page. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (20%), supported by evidence indicating no evidence of data destruction, but high-risk financial data exposed. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.
Sources & References
- Agree.com Rankiteo Cyber Incident Details: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/agreehq/incident/AGR1770850632
- Agree.com CyberSecurity Rating page: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/agreehq
- Agree.com Rankiteo Cyber Incident Blog Article: https://blog.rankiteo.com/agr1770850632-agreeto-vulnerability-february-2026/
- Agree.com CyberSecurity Score History: https://www.rankiteo.com/company/agreehq/history
- Agree.com CyberSecurity Incident Source: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-store-outlook-add-in-hijacked-to-steal-4-000-microsoft-accounts/
- Rankiteo A.I CyberSecurity Rating methodology: https://www.rankiteo.com/Images/rankiteo_algo.pdf
- Rankiteo TPRM Scoring methodology: https://static.rankiteo.com/model/rankiteo_tprm_methodology.pdf