Comparison Overview
AGC Engineering Co., Ltd.

AGC Engineering Co., Ltd.
WBG Marive West 19F, 2-6-1, Nakase, Mihama-ku, Chiba City, 2617119, JP
Last Update: 02/04/2026
AGC Engineering is a wholly owned subsidiary of AGC Inc., one of the world’s largest manufacturers of glass, electronic displays and chemical products based in Tokyo, Japan. AGC Engineering is specialized in developing and manufacturing ion- exchange resin products. <...

Braskem
Rua Lemos Monteiro, 120, São Paulo, 05501-050, BR
Last Update: 08/09/2026
With a global vision of the future, oriented toward people and sustainability, Braskem is engaged in contributing to the value chain in order to strengthen the Circular Economy. Its almost 9,000 team members are dedicated to improving people’s lives through sustainable ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

AGC Engineering Co., Ltd.







Braskem






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Plastics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AGC Engineering Co., Ltd. in 2026.
Incidents vs Plastics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Braskem in 2026.
Incident History - AGC Engineering Co., Ltd. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AGC Engineering Co., Ltd. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Braskem (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Braskem cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

AGC Engineering Co., Ltd.

Braskem
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.