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Analyze » 1inch » 1IN1774607100

Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (1IN1774607100)

The details regarding individual company incidents & reports gives you full view from every side.

Rankiteo Score Impact Analysis

Rankiteo Incident Impact-18
Company Score Before Incident754 / 1000
Company Score After Incident736 / 1000
Company LinkView 1inch Profile
INCIDENT NUMBER1IN1774607100
Type of Cyber IncidentCyber Attack
ATTACK VECTORSocial Engineering (Fake Screenshots), DLL Sideloading
DATA EXPOSEDNA
INCIDENT DATE01/06/2025
STATUSpublished

Key Highlights From The Incident Analysis

  • Timeline of 1inch's Cyber Attack and lateral movement inside company's environment.
  • Overview of affected data sets, including SSNs and PHI, and why they materially increase incident severity.
  • How Rankiteo’s incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score.
  • How this cyber incident impacts 1inch Rankiteo cyber scoring and cyber rating.
  • Rankiteo’s MITRE ATT&CK correlation analysis for this incident, with associated confidence level.

Full Incident Analysis Transcript

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the 1inch breach identified under incident ID 1IN1774607100.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of 1inch's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/1inchcom, the number of followers: 54604, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 169 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 754 and after the incident was 736 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on 1inch and their customers.

1inch recently reported "Sophisticated Malware Campaign Targets Web3 Support Teams via Fake Screenshots", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A highly targeted malware campaign is exploiting customer support channels of Web3 platforms, with decentralized exchange 1inch recently identifying a persistent threat aimed at its staff.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Workstations of Web3 support teams.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

MITRE ATT&CK® Correlation Analysis

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing Link (T1566.002) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including sharing links disguised as innocuous screenshots, and attackers masquerade as frustrated users. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including links trigger a multi-stage infection chain, and initial loader (photo2025060268jpg.exe) and Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating dLL sideloading, using legitimately signed executable (updat.exe). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating malicious vcruntime140.dll and msvcp140.dll loaded via trusted app and Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating establish persistent backdoor access (implied). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating custom runtime encryption scheme to conceal strings, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating impersonating Windows Update cache with @27 tag, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (T1497) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating anti-debugging and sandbox-evasion checks, and Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating bypassing signature verification via trusted executable. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating communicates with 37 distinct C2 servers over TCP port 15628, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 16-byte rolling XOR cipher to encrypt traffic, and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating retrieving a payload manifest from an AWS S3 dead drop. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating establish persistent backdoor access (implies data exfil). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.

Initial Access
Phishing: Spearphishing Link (90%)
Execution
User Execution: Malicious File (80%)
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (90%)
Persistence
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (80%)
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (60%)
Defense Evasion
Obfuscated Files or Information (90%)
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (90%)
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (80%)
Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading (90%)
Command and Control
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (70%)
Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (80%)
Ingress Tool Transfer (80%)
Exfiltration
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (70%)

Sources & References