Comparison Overview
17a-4 LLC

17a-4 LLC
New York, 10016, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
17a-4 llc was established to address the expanding regulatory requirements imposed on financial institutions. 17a-4's approach bridges Compliance, Legal and Information Technology management to offer comprehensive compliance solutions for regulated content including e...

Just Eat Takeaway.com
Piet Heinkade 61, Amsterdam, North Holland, NL, 1019 GM
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Just Eat Takeaway.com is a leading global online delivery marketplace, connecting consumers and restaurants through our platform in 16 countries. Like a dinner table, working at JET brings our office employees and couriers together. From coding to customer...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

17a-4 LLC







Just Eat Takeaway.com






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for 17a-4 LLC in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Just Eat Takeaway.com in 2026.
Incident History - 17a-4 LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
17a-4 LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Just Eat Takeaway.com (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Just Eat Takeaway.com cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

17a-4 LLC

Just Eat Takeaway.com
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.