Comparison Overview
Zé Delivery

Zé Delivery
Rua Fradique Coutinho 1632, São Paulo, undefined, 05416010, BR
Last Update: 04/12/2025
O Zé Delivery faz parte do nosso DTC, que é a frente de produtos voltada diretamente ao consumidor. Ele surgiu no Brasil em 2016 e desde então entrega bebida gelada, em menos de 30 minutos, e com preço de supermercado, diretamentena casa dos nossos consumidores. Nos...

Asurion
1101 Church St, Nashville, 37203, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
As the world’s leading tech care company, Asurion eliminates the fears and frustrations associated with technology, to ensure our 300 million customers get the most out of their devices, appliances and connections. We provide insurance, repair, replacement, installation...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Zé Delivery







Asurion






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Zé Delivery in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Asurion has 0.99% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Zé Delivery (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Zé Delivery cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Asurion (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Asurion cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Zé Delivery

Asurion
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.