Comparison Overview
ZAMP

ZAMP
São Paulo, 05501-050, BR
Last Update: 20/09/2026
Somos um grande ecossistema de restaurantes que reúne marcas internacionais como Burger King®, Popeyes®, Starbucks® e Subway®. E, por trás de cada receita de sucesso, estão os Zampers: gente que faz acontecer, que joga junto e que deixa sua marca todos os dias. Aqui,...

Red Lobster
450 S Orange Ave, Orlando, 32801, US
Last Update: 06/09/2026
With over 30,000 employees and more than 500 restaurants in the United States and Canada, Red Lobster is the world’s largest seafood restaurant company. Our vision is to be where the world goes for seafood now and for generations. Red Lobster is an innovative, values...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ZAMP







Red Lobster






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ZAMP in 2026.
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Red Lobster in 2026.
Incident History - ZAMP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ZAMP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Red Lobster (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Red Lobster cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ZAMP

Red Lobster
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Horilla is an HR and CRM software. Prior to 2.0.0, HorillaListView.export_data in horilla_views/generic/cbv/views.py accepts an authenticated user's columns POST parameter, takes field_tuple[1], interpolates it into dynamic_fn_str as Python source, and passes the generated function definition to exec(). A crafted string that remains valid under ast.literal_eval can inject Python syntax into a default argument evaluated during function definition, allowing arbitrary operating-system commands to execute with the application process privileges, including root privileges in the shipped Docker image. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.
Horilla is an HR and CRM software. Prior to 2.0.0, approve_validate_attendance_request at /attendance/approve-validate-attendance-request/ changes attendance_validated, is_validate_request_approved, approved_by, and related pending-request state through an HTTP GET before calling attendance.save(), so Django does not require CSRF validation for the action. An unauthenticated attacker can cause a logged-in manager with attendance.change_attendance to make a top-level request that carries the manager's SameSite=Lax session cookie, silently approving attendance with the victim's privileges and attributing the approval to the victim in the audit trail. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.0.
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to 26.7.0, Actual Sync Server's CORS proxy is intended to let authenticated users fetch resources only from repositories listed in the official plugin allowlist. When `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN` is configured, the proxy automatically attaches the server's GitHub token to GitHub requests. The GitHub API allowlist check uses a raw `startsWith()` prefix test for `/repos/{owner}/{repo}` without requiring a path boundary after the repository name. If an allowlisted public plugin repository is `https://github.com/acme/plugin`, the proxy also accepts GitHub API URLs. Those URLs are outside the allowlisted repository but still pass because their API path starts with `/repos/acme/plugin`. The proxy then forwards the request with the server's `ACTUAL_GITHUB_TOKEN`, allowing any authenticated Actual user to read private GitHub resources reachable by that token. Version 26.7.0 fixes the issue.
The convert.base64-encode, convert.quoted-printable-encode and convert.quoted-printable-decode stream filters accept a line-break-chars option whose length is tracked separately from the string itself. The filter constructors duplicate the value with pestrdup(), which stops at the first NUL byte, while keeping the original length. When the filter later emits a line break it copies the recorded length out of the truncated allocation, reading past its end and placing adjacent heap bytes into the filter output.
The IPv6 branch of the FastCGI client access check compares only the first 12 bytes of a 16-byte IPv6 address, so listen.allowed_clients matches on a /96 prefix instead of the exact address. An attacker who can source an address sharing the first 96 bits with an allowed one passes the check and reaches the FastCGI endpoint.