Comparison Overview
Żabka Group

Żabka Group
N/A
Last Update: 03/08/2026
Żabka Group – The Ultimate Convenience Ecosystem 🟩 Żabka Group is a modern convenience ecosystem with a mission to simplify everyday life. At its core is Żabka Polska – Poland’s leading convenience retailer, operating over 12 000 franchise stores and autonomous Żabka...

Esselunga
Via Giambologna 1, Limito di Pioltello, 20096, IT
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Esselunga è una delle principali catene italiane nel settore della grande distribuzione. La sua storia inizia nel 1957 con l'apertura a Milano del primo supermercato in Italia; oggi, attraverso una rete di oltre 180 negozi, il gruppo è presente in Lombardia, Toscana, Em...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Żabka Group







Esselunga






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
Żabka Group has 45.36% fewer incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Esselunga in 2026.
Incident History - Żabka Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Żabka Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Esselunga (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Esselunga cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Żabka Group

Esselunga
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.