Comparison Overview
Yara Brasil

Yara Brasil
R. Diogo Moreira, 184, São Paulo, São Paulo, 05423-010, BR
Last Update: 27/02/2026
A Yara, líder mundial em nutrição de plantas, cultiva conhecimento para alimentar o mundo e proteger o planeta de forma responsável. Para concretizar o compromisso de cultivar um futuro alimentar positivo para a natureza, oferece um portfólio de produtos de alta tecnolo...

Syngenta Group
Rosentalstrasse 67, Basel, 4002, CH
Last Update: 02/06/2026
To help feed 10 billion people while reducing emissions and improve biodiversity. This is our mission as the global agriculture technology leader. With over 56,000 employees in more than 90 countries and hundreds of thousands of agricultural partners worldwide, we are c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Yara Brasil







Syngenta Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Farming Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Yara Brasil in 2026.
Incidents vs Farming Industry Avg (This Year)
Syngenta Group has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Yara Brasil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Yara Brasil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Syngenta Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Syngenta Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Yara Brasil

Syngenta Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::updatePermissions that allows GROUP_EDIT administrators to grant arbitrary rights to groups without verifying they hold those rights themselves. A delegated administrator can exploit this by assigning high-value permissions to a group they belong to, inheriting those rights and escalating privileges up to full administrative control.
n8n before 2.25.7 and 2.26.x before 2.26.2 contains an abstract syntax tree (AST) security validator bypass in the Python Code node. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code node can bypass the validator and access the task executor module namespace. The issue only affects self-hosted instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled; where N8N_BLOCK_RUNNER_ENV_ACCESS is configured to allow it, this can disclose environment variables accessible to the task runner process.
Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability within the debug.pl script that is reachable without authentication. A remote attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate input sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges on the underlying system.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability in the ms_service.pl service, which listens on TCP port 9000 by default and accepts custom network packets to perform device actions. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted packet containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges.