Comparison Overview
Xoserve

Xoserve
Lansdowne Gate, Solihull, B91 3DL, GB
Last Update: 31/03/2026
At Xoserve, we handle data. Huge amounts of data. In fact, we’re the custodians of data used by the whole of the UK gas industry. We manage all the key data associated with the majority of the 23 million gas meter points across the country. We carry out registration an...

EDP
Av. 24 de Julho, Lisboa, 1249 - 300, PT
Last Update: 03/09/2026
Our story began 50 years ago. Today, we are a global energy company leading the transition to a more sustainable future. We produce and deliver electricity to millions of families, businesses and communities worldwide, with a strong focus on renewable energy. More than...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Xoserve







EDP






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Xoserve in 2026.
Incidents vs Utilities Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for EDP in 2026.
Incident History - Xoserve (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Xoserve cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - EDP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
EDP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Xoserve

EDP
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.