Comparison Overview
WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks

WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks
51 Lime Street, London, EC3M 7DQ, GB
Last Update: 02/04/2026
We have teams of experts worldwide that advise senior management on Financial Lines of business such as Executive and Professional Risks, Credit, Political and Terrorism insurance. We have teams based in Great Britain, North America, Western Europe, Asia, Latin America,...

FWD Insurance
13/F, City Plaza 3, 14 Taikoo Wan Road, Quarry Bay, _, HK
Last Update: 07/09/2026
FWD Group (1828.HK) is a pan-Asian life and health insurance business that serves approximately 34 million customers across 10 markets, including BRI Life in Indonesia. FWD’s customer-led and tech-enabled approach aims to deliver innovative propositions, easy-to-underst...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks







FWD Insurance






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for FWD Insurance in 2026.
Incident History - WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks (X = Date, Y = Severity)
WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - FWD Insurance (X = Date, Y = Severity)
FWD Insurance cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

WTW Financial, Executive & Professional Risks

FWD Insurance
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.