Comparison Overview
WSP in Italia

WSP in Italia
Via Antonio Banfo 43, Torino, Torino, IT, 10155
Last Update: 20/01/2026
WSP è una delle principali società di servizi professionali al mondo, impegniamo la nostra consulenza ingegneristica e scientifica per orientare le comunità verso il progresso dell’umanità. Partendo da radici locali fino a diventare una realtà globale, WSP è attiva in o...

WSP
1600, boul. René-Lévesque ouest, 11e étage, Montreal, Quebec, CA, H3H 1P9
Last Update: 29/03/2026
We are one of the world’s leading professional services firms, uniting our engineering, advisory and science-based expertise to shape communities to advance humanity. From local beginnings to a globe-spanning presence today, we operate in over 50 countries and emplo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

WSP in Italia







WSP






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for WSP in Italia in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for WSP in 2026.
Incident History - WSP in Italia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
WSP in Italia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - WSP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
WSP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

WSP in Italia

WSP
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
phpMyFAQ before 4.1.5 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in GroupController::updatePermissions that allows GROUP_EDIT administrators to grant arbitrary rights to groups without verifying they hold those rights themselves. A delegated administrator can exploit this by assigning high-value permissions to a group they belong to, inheriting those rights and escalating privileges up to full administrative control.
n8n before 2.25.7 and 2.26.x before 2.26.2 contains an abstract syntax tree (AST) security validator bypass in the Python Code node. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows containing a Python Code node can bypass the validator and access the task executor module namespace. The issue only affects self-hosted instances where the Python Task Runner is enabled; where N8N_BLOCK_RUNNER_ENV_ACCESS is configured to allow it, this can disclose environment variables accessible to the task runner process.
Grav CMS before 2.0.0-beta.2 contains multiple code-execution vulnerabilities. Three unsafe unserialize() calls - in Scheduler\JobQueue, Framework\Cache\Adapter\FileCache, and Session - deserialize untrusted data without restricting allowed classes, enabling PHP object injection and, via a gadget chain, arbitrary code execution where an attacker controls the serialized input. Additionally, InstallCommand's git clone operation passes the branch, url, and path parameters into a shell command without escaping, allowing OS command injection via plugin/theme installation (which requires admin access). A Twig security blocklist bypass (server-side template injection) is also present. The issues are fixed in 2.0.0-beta.2.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability within the debug.pl script that is reachable without authentication. A remote attacker can submit a specially crafted HTTP request containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate input sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges on the underlying system.
Storage Concentrator (SC & SCVM) contains a command injection vulnerability in the ms_service.pl service, which listens on TCP port 9000 by default and accepts custom network packets to perform device actions. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted packet containing a malicious payload that is processed without adequate sanitization, resulting in arbitrary command execution with root-level privileges.