Comparison Overview
WSP en Perú

WSP en Perú
5895 Avenida Paseo de la República, Miraflores, Lima, 15074, PE
Last Update: 08/12/2025
Somos una de las principales firmas de servicios profesionales del mundo, uniendo nuestra experiencia en ingeniería, asesoría y ciencia para dar forma a las comunidades y avanzar en la humanidad. Desde nuestros inicios locales hasta nuestra presencia global actual, op...

Grant Thornton (US)
171 N. Clark Street, Suite 200, Chicago, IL, US, 60601
Last Update: 05/09/2026
In the US, Grant Thornton LLP and Grant Thornton Advisors LLC (and their respective subsidiary entities) practice as an alternative practice structure in accordance with the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct and applicable law, regulations and professional standards. G...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

WSP en Perú







Grant Thornton (US)






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for WSP en Perú in 2026.
Incidents vs Professional Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Grant Thornton (US) in 2026.
Incident History - WSP en Perú (X = Date, Y = Severity)
WSP en Perú cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Grant Thornton (US) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grant Thornton (US) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

WSP en Perú

Grant Thornton (US)
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.