Comparison Overview
Woodie's

Woodie's
Tallaght Bypass, Dublin, Dublin 24, IE
Last Update: 05/12/2025
Launched in 1988 Woodie’s is a 100% Irish owned DIY, Home and Garden retailer and part of Grafton Group plc. We’re going through an exciting period of transformation and brand revitalisation, helping our customer make the most of their homes and gardens and sustaining o...

Boots UK
1 Thane Road, Nottingham, NG90 1BS, GB
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Boots is the UK’s leading health and beauty retailer with over 52,000 team members and around 1,800 stores,* ranging from local community pharmacies to large destination health and beauty stores. We serve our customers and patients’ wellbeing for life as the leading pr...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Woodie's







Boots UK






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Woodie's in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Boots UK in 2026.
Incident History - Woodie's (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Woodie's cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Boots UK (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Boots UK cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Woodie's

Boots UK
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function pathinfo of the file /upload_files.php of the component Filename Extension. Performing a manipulation results in unrestricted upload. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /process_lesson.php. Such manipulation of the argument user_id leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was determined in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /paymentdischarge.php. This manipulation of the argument patientid causes sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
A vulnerability was found in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /payment.php. The manipulation of the argument patientid results in sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").