Comparison Overview
Webroot

Webroot
385 Interlocken Crescent, Broomfield, 80021, US
Last Update: 14/03/2026
Webroot, an OpenText company, was the first to harness the cloud and artificial intelligence to stop zero-day threats in real time. We provide endpoint protection, network protection, and security awareness training solutions purpose built for managed service providers ...

NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS
Suwalska 19/1, Poznan, 60-461, PL
Last Update: 21/09/2026
## Our core business We manage linux / unix server infrastructures and build the efficient and secure networking environments using hardware cutting edge technologies suited to the needs of the project and the client. We believe in quality, opposed to quantity. O...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Webroot







NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Computer and Network Security Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Webroot in 2026.
Incidents vs Computer and Network Security Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS in 2026.
Incident History - Webroot (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Webroot cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Webroot

NETWORK-SECURITY-SOLUTIONS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.