Comparison Overview
Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101)

Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101)
1 Hong Kong Science Park East Avenue, Shatin, 00000, HK
Last Update: 11/03/2026
WBD101 is the world’s leader in non invasive in-ear sensing technology. Our Single Point Multi-Modal technology covers bio-signals like Heart Rate, Core Body Temperature, Respiratory Rate, Blood Oxygen SpO2, HR Variability, HR Recovery and motion. Our competitors eithe...

Arm
110 Fulbourn Road, Cambridge, Cambs, GB, CB1 9NJ
Last Update: 20/09/2026
Arm’s foundational technology is defining the future of computing. A future built by the greatest technology ecosystem in the world. A future built on Arm. Arm is everywhere technology matters. Technology matters everywhere. Together, we’ll power every technology revo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101)







Arm






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101) in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Arm in 2026.
Incident History - Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Arm (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Arm cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Well Being Digital Limited (WBD101)

Arm
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.