Comparison Overview
Wayne Fueling Systems

Wayne Fueling Systems
3814 Jarrett Way, Austin, 78728, US
Last Update: 15/02/2026
Wayne Fueling Systems, part of Dover Fueling Solutions® (DFS), is one of the world’s largest suppliers of fuel dispensers, payment terminals, forecourt control devices, point-of-sale and other measurement and control solutions to the retail and commercial fueling indust...

Siemens
Werner-von-Siemens-Straße 1, Munich, 80333, DE
Last Update: 02/08/2026
Siemens AG (Berlin and Munich) is a leading technology company focused on industry, infrastructure, mobility, and healthcare. The company’s purpose is to create technology to transform the everyday, for everyone. By combining the real and the digital worlds, Siemens emp...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Wayne Fueling Systems







Siemens






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Automation Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Wayne Fueling Systems in 2026.
Incidents vs Automation Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Siemens has 288.35% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Wayne Fueling Systems (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Wayne Fueling Systems cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Siemens (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Siemens cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Wayne Fueling Systems

Siemens
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.