Comparison Overview
Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS

Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS
Celsiusstraat 34, Ede, 6716 BZ, NL
Last Update: 04/04/2026
As a subsidiary of Veolia Water Technologies, VWT Techno Center Netherlands BV offers two ranges of technologies for removal of hydrocarbons from water. We have offered our solutions to over 100 clients worldwide. Many of these are still being served on daily basis by e...

Dalkia
204 rue Sadi Carnot , Saint-André-Lez-Lille, 59350, FR
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Dalkia : ensemble, relevons le défi climatique ! Depuis 85 ans, Dalkia, filiale du groupe EDF et leader dans les services énergétiques, investit et développe les énergies renouvelables et de récupération et accompagne ses clients dans la durée pour les aider à faire des...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS







Dalkia






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS in 2026.
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dalkia in 2026.
Incident History - Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Dalkia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dalkia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Veolia | Water Tech - MPPE/S & TiPSS

Dalkia
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.