Comparison Overview
VXI Global Solutions

VXI Global Solutions
515 S Figueroa St, Los Angeles, 90071, US
Last Update: 03/04/2026
About VXI Global Solutions VXI Global Solutions is a BPO leader in customer service, customer experience, and digital solutions. Founded in 1998, the company has 40,000+ employees in 43 locations in North America, Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. VXI delivers omnich...

Majorel
Luxembourg, LU
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Majorel has been acquired by TP allowing us to deliver even more exceptional services in more locations worldwide and on a greater scale than ever before. We deliver the most advanced, digitally-powered business services to help the world’s best brands streamline their...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

VXI Global Solutions







Majorel






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Outsourcing and Offshoring Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VXI Global Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Outsourcing and Offshoring Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Majorel has 5.66% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - VXI Global Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VXI Global Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Majorel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Majorel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

VXI Global Solutions

Majorel
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.