Comparison Overview
VNG

VNG
Number 13 Street, Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone, Ho Chi Minh, 70000, VN
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Established in 2004, VNG is the leading homegrown digital ecosystem in Vietnam, with diverse products serving the needs of 100 million customers in Vietnam and many countries worldwide. VNG focuses on four main businesses: online games, communications & media, fintech, ...

Avnet
2211 South 47th Street, Phoenix, AZ, US, 85034
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Avnet is a global electronic components distributor with extensive design, product, marketing and supply chain expertise for customers and suppliers at every stage of the product lifecycle. For the past 100 years, Avnet has helped its customers and suppliers around the ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

VNG







Avnet






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VNG in 2026.
Incidents vs Technology, Information and Internet Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Avnet in 2026.
Incident History - VNG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VNG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Avnet (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Avnet cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

VNG

Avnet
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
vLLM through 0.29.0 fails to properly clean up decode-side metadata for rejected inference requests in prefill/decode disaggregated deployments. Remote attackers can submit requests with max_tokens=0 to exhaust decode-worker memory without bound until the worker restarts.
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/v0.29.0/vllm/distributed/kv_transfer/kv_connector/v1/nixl/push_worker.py#L162-L181
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/55677
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vllm-through-0.29.0-memory-exhaustion-via-rejected-requests
redis-parser through 3.0.0 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the RESP protocol parser that allows malicious Redis endpoints to crash the client process through unbounded recursion on nested arrays. Attackers can send crafted RESP byte streams with repeated array headers that exhaust the V8 call stack, causing an uncaught RangeError that terminates the Node.js process without triggering error handling callbacks.
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L204-L213
- https://github.com/NodeRedis/node-redis-parser/blob/701655430f5f7d9ca00892a02f7eefcbc1193a98/lib/parser.js#L291-L306
- https://github.com/redis/ioredis/issues/2108
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/redis-parser-through-3.0.0-denial-of-service-via-unbounded-recursion
Improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component ('injection') in Azure Cosmos DB allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Missing authentication for critical function in Azure AI Foundry allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.