Comparison Overview
Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA)

Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA)
1 Market St, San Francisco, 94105, US
Last Update: 09/03/2026
The Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA) team – Visa’s payments advisory arm – provides data-driven expert analysis to issuers, acquirers, merchants, fintechs and other partners to stay current on payment trends and consumer behaviors. VCA uses in-house economic intellige...

Marsh McLennan
1166 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY, US, 10036
Last Update: 05/04/2026
Marsh (NYSE: MRSH) is a global leader in risk, strategy and people, advising clients in 130 countries across four businesses: Marsh Risk, Guy Carpenter, Mercer and Oliver Wyman. With annual revenue over $24 billion and more than 90,000 ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA)







Marsh McLennan






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA) in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Marsh McLennan in 2026.
Incident History - Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Marsh McLennan (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Marsh McLennan cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Visa Consulting & Analytics (VCA)

Marsh McLennan
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.