Comparison Overview
Virtusa Asia Pacific

Virtusa Asia Pacific
Level 12, 31, Market Street, Sydney, NSW 2000, AU
Last Update: 04/02/2026
Virtusa is a global product and platform engineering services company that makes experiences better with technology. We help organizations grow faster, more profitably, and more sustainably by reimagining enterprises through domain-driven solutions. We combine strategy,...

Canon EMEA
4 Roundwood Avenue, Stockley Park, Uxbridge, GB, UB11 1AF
Last Update: 05/09/2026
We are Canon Europe. We are the world's best imaging company. This page represents our offices in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Founded in 1937, the desire to continuously innovate has kept Canon at the forefront of imaging excellence throughout its 85-year histo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Virtusa Asia Pacific







Canon EMEA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Virtusa Asia Pacific in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Canon EMEA in 2026.
Incident History - Virtusa Asia Pacific (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Virtusa Asia Pacific cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Canon EMEA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Canon EMEA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Virtusa Asia Pacific

Canon EMEA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.