Comparison Overview
Vip mobile d.o.o.

Vip mobile d.o.o.
Milutina Milankovića 1ž, Belgrade, 11000, RS
Last Update: 10/12/2025
We started in 2007 from zero and in just six months, we built a new mobile operator in Serbia, employing more than 400 experts. In just two years, we have reached 1 million users and doubled this number in 2014. We arrived at the market as a third operator, but in many...

Vodafone
1 Kingdom Street, Paddington Central, London, GB, W2 6BY
Last Update: 02/04/2026
At Vodafone, we believe that connectivity is a force for good. If we use it for the things that really matter, it can improve people's lives and the world around us. Through our technology we empower people, connecting everyone regardless of who they are or where they...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Vip mobile d.o.o.







Vodafone






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Vip mobile d.o.o. in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Vodafone in 2026.
Incident History - Vip mobile d.o.o. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vip mobile d.o.o. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Vodafone (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vodafone cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Vip mobile d.o.o.

Vodafone
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.