Comparison Overview
Vip mobile d.o.o.

Vip mobile d.o.o.
Milutina Milankovića 1ž, Belgrade, 11000, RS
Last Update: 10/12/2025
We started in 2007 from zero and in just six months, we built a new mobile operator in Serbia, employing more than 400 experts. In just two years, we have reached 1 million users and doubled this number in 2014. We arrived at the market as a third operator, but in many...

Bell
1 carrefour Alexandre-Graham-Bell, Montreal, Quebec, CA, H3E 3B3
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We advance how people connect with each other and the world #ConnectionIsEverything. Bell is Canada's largest communications company providing advanced Bell broadband wireless, Internet, TV, media and business communications services. Founded in Montréal in 1880, Bell...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Vip mobile d.o.o.







Bell






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Vip mobile d.o.o. in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Bell has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Vip mobile d.o.o. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vip mobile d.o.o. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Bell (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bell cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Vip mobile d.o.o.

Bell
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.