Comparison Overview
Viaccess-Orca

Viaccess-Orca
9/11, Allée de l'arche, Courbevoie, 92400, FR
Last Update: 20/02/2026
Bringing video and security together for over two decades, Viaccess-Orca (VO) provides premium TV platforms, OTT and content protection to TV operators, broadcasters and content providers around the world, and offers an extensive range of innovative E2E solutions & serv...

Bell
1 carrefour Alexandre-Graham-Bell, Montreal, Quebec, CA, H3E 3B3
Last Update: 05/09/2026
We advance how people connect with each other and the world #ConnectionIsEverything. Bell is Canada's largest communications company providing advanced Bell broadband wireless, Internet, TV, media and business communications services. Founded in Montréal in 1880, Bell...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Viaccess-Orca







Bell






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Viaccess-Orca in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Bell has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Viaccess-Orca (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Viaccess-Orca cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Bell (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bell cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Viaccess-Orca

Bell
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.