Comparison Overview
Verizon Business

Verizon Business
1 Verizon Way, Basking Ridge, 07920-1097, US
Last Update: 20/05/2026
You’re more than a business, agency or organization leader. We’re more than the usual network that provides reliable coverage. Together, we can empower you and your people.

Amadeus
C/Salvador de Madariaga 1, Madrid, 28027, ES
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We make the experience of travel better for everyone, everywhere by inspiring innovation, partnerships and responsibility to people, places and planet. Our technology powers the travel and tourism industry. We inspire more connected ways of thinking, centered around ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Verizon Business







Amadeus






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
Verizon Business has 34.23% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Amadeus in 2026.
Incident History - Verizon Business (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Verizon Business cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Amadeus (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amadeus cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Verizon Business

Amadeus
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
docker-socket-proxy fails to properly gate read endpoints in the /containers Docker API namespace when the CONTAINERS environment variable is set. Attackers can use GET requests to /containers/{id}/archive, /containers/{id}/export, /containers/{id}/logs, and /containers/{id}/top to read arbitrary files and download entire container filesystems as tar archives.
- https://gist.github.com/nedlir/e4f52f88a757f02c67db1fd5dd70d732
- https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy
- https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy/blob/v0.5.0/haproxy.cfg#L49-L61
- https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy/issues/182
- https://github.com/Tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy/pull/183
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/docker-socket-proxy-through-insufficient-access-control-granularity-exposes-container-filesystems
A vulnerability has been found in Systerel S2OPC up to 1.7.3. Impacted is the function SOPC_NodeMgtHelperInternal_AddVariableNodeAttributes of the file src/ClientServer/address_space/internal/sopc_node_mgt_helper_internal.c of the component AddNodes Service. The manipulation of the argument UserAccessLevel leads to out-of-bounds read. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. A high degree of complexity is needed for the attack. The exploitability is considered difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of the patch is aafbd37d381b618312ebdf5ddf57027f62c14fdd. It is suggested to install a patch to address this issue.
- https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29702766/PoC.zip
- https://gitlab.com/systerel/S2OPC/-/commit/aafbd37d381b618312ebdf5ddf57027f62c14fdd
- https://gitlab.com/systerel/S2OPC/-/merge_requests/1826
- https://gitlab.com/systerel/S2OPC/-/work_items/1787
- https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-78049
- https://vuldb.com/submit/881262
- https://vuldb.com/vuln/394290
- https://vuldb.com/vuln/394290/cti
The Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver's transmit callback airoc_mgmt_send() in drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c allocates a net_buf from the fixed airoc_pool for every outbound packet. When whd_network_send_ethernet_data() returns a synchronous failure, the underlying WHD library does not take ownership of the buffer, but the pre-fix driver returned -EIO without releasing it. Each failed transmit therefore permanently leaks one buffer from the pool. airoc_pool is small and fixed (AIROC_WIFI_TX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT + AIROC_WIFI_RX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT, default 20 buffers) and is shared by WHD's whd_host_buffer_get callback for both transmit and receive. Once enough send failures have leaked the pool dry, airoc_wifi_host_buffer_get() returns WHD_BUFFER_ALLOC_FAIL for all subsequent allocations, so both transmit and the WHD-driven receive path fail and Wi-Fi connectivity is lost until the device is rebooted. The leak occurs only on the transmit error path. A Wi-Fi-adjacent attacker can influence the conditions that cause synchronous send failures (for example by deauthenticating/disassociating the station while the local stack continues to attempt transmits), and ordinary transient failures over the device's lifetime accumulate toward the same state. Reliable on-demand triggering is of high complexity and the impact is availability-only, but the resulting denial of service is permanent and non-recoverable without a reboot. The fix releases the buffer with airoc_wifi_buffer_release() on the failure branch, returning it to the pool. The commit also removes a redundant k_sem_give() in airoc_mgmt_disconnect(); because data->sema_common is a binary semaphore (limit 1) the duplicate give merely saturated at 1 and had no security impact.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gpio: pca953x: fix pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock regmap lock Locking is disabled in the regmap config as this driver uses its own lock. This means that all calls to regmap functions (read or write) must hold the i2c_lock. The function pca953x_irq_bus_sync_unlock() did not do this, and it was therefore possible that multiple threads could cause an incorrect register to be read/written. A previous patch partly fixed this, but only protected the write to the interrupt mask register, and not the read from the direction register.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Check for tg ops in dce110_set_avmute Some older DCE timing generators do not implement is_tg_enabled in their ops table. Calling it unconditionally when waiting for AV mute frames causes a NULL pointer dereference on Southern Islands dGPUs when turning the display off over HDMI. Check that tg and the required ops exist before waiting for frames. (cherry picked from commit 2686a0c0aaa07bec2e24131835cf27b5fd4935a5)