Comparison Overview
Vector Disease Control International (VDCI)

Vector Disease Control International (VDCI)
1320 Brookwood Drive, Little Rock, AR, 72202, US
Last Update: 28/11/2025
Vector Disease Control International (VDCI) partners with municipalities, city and state governments and commercial properties to provide mosquito management services to communities in more than 20 states and internationally. VDCI strives to improve the quality of life ...

Veolia | Water Tech
30, Rue Madeleine Vionnet, Aubervilliers, Île-de-France, FR, 93300
Last Update: 04/04/2026
As the world leader in water technologies and services, Veolia relies on its 17,500 water technology experts to deliver innovative solutions that drive both performance and sustainability, without compromise. With over 4,400 technology patents and serving more than 14,0...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Vector Disease Control International (VDCI)







Veolia | Water Tech






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Vector Disease Control International (VDCI) in 2026.
Incidents vs Environmental Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Veolia | Water Tech in 2026.
Incident History - Vector Disease Control International (VDCI) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Vector Disease Control International (VDCI) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Veolia | Water Tech (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Veolia | Water Tech cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Vector Disease Control International (VDCI)

Veolia | Water Tech
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.