Comparison Overview
VDL KTI

VDL KTI
Nijverheidsstraat 10, Mol, 2400, BE
Last Update: 10/03/2026
𝗩𝗗𝗟 𝗞𝗧𝗜, 𝗮 𝗺𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗼𝗳 𝗩𝗗𝗟 𝗚𝗿𝗼𝗲𝗽, 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗻 𝗲𝗻𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴-𝘀𝘂𝗽𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗳𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗿 𝗯𝗮𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝗻 𝗕𝗲𝗹𝗴𝗶𝘂𝗺. The company was established in 1971 as KTI Belgium and has built up a solid worldwide reputation throughou...

Wärtsilä
Hiililaiturinkuja 2, Helsinki, 00180, FI
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We enable sustainable societies through innovation in technology and services together with all our stakeholders – today and tomorrow. We emphasise innovation in sustainable technology and services to help our customers continuously improve environmental and economic p...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

VDL KTI







Wärtsilä






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VDL KTI in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Wärtsilä in 2026.
Incident History - VDL KTI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VDL KTI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Wärtsilä (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Wärtsilä cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

VDL KTI

Wärtsilä
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.