Comparison Overview
VB Spine

VB Spine
600 Hope Pkwy SE, Leesburg, Virginia, US, 20175
Last Update: 11/03/2026
VB Spine, LLC is the largest privately held spine company and among the largest family-owned medical technology companies in the world. Our globally recognized identity as innovators and stewards of the spine industry reflects our commitment to patient outcomes first. W...

Henry Schein
135 Duryea Road, Melville, 11747, US
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Henry Schein, Inc. (Nasdaq: HSIC) is a products, services, and technology platforms company for healthcare customers. With more than 25,000 Team Schein Members worldwide, the Company's network of trusted advisors provides more than 1 million customers globally with more...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

VB Spine







Henry Schein






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VB Spine in 2026.
Incidents vs Medical Equipment Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Henry Schein has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - VB Spine (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VB Spine cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Henry Schein (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Henry Schein cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

VB Spine

Henry Schein
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.