Comparison Overview
Van Cleef & Arpels

Van Cleef & Arpels
75001, Place Vendôme, Paris, Île-de-France, 75001, FR
Last Update: 21/01/2026
Van Cleef & Arpels was born in Paris’ place Vendôme in 1906, following Alfred Van Cleef’s marriage to Estelle Arpels in 1895. For over a century, their names have graced some of the finest High Jewelry ever created. Over the years, the Maison has remained faithful to a...

Richemont
Chemin de la Chênaie 50, Bellevue, Geneva, CH, 1293
Last Update: 05/09/2026
At Richemont, we craft the future. Our unique portfolio includes prestigious Maisons distinguished by their craftsmanship and creativity. Richemont’s ambition is to nurture its Maisons and businesses and enable them to grow and prosper in a responsible, sustainable mann...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Van Cleef & Arpels







Richemont






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Luxury Goods and Jewelry Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Van Cleef & Arpels in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Luxury Goods and Jewelry Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Richemont in 2026.
Incident History - Van Cleef & Arpels (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Van Cleef & Arpels cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Richemont (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Richemont cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Van Cleef & Arpels

Richemont
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.