Comparison Overview
General Secretariat GS-DETEC

General Secretariat GS-DETEC
Kochergasse 10, Bern, undefined, 3011, CH
Last Update: 05/02/2026
Mit Expertise in die Zukunft. Das Eidgenössische Departement für Umwelt, Verkehr, Energie und Kommunikation (UVEK) plant und gestaltet die Energie-, Kommunikations- und Verkehrsströme der Schweiz und sorgt dafür, dass sich unser Land nachhaltig entwickelt. Über 2'500 Mi...

Tata Group
Bombay House, Mumbai, 400001, IN
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Founded by Jamsetji Tata in 1868, the Tata group is a global enterprise headquartered in India. The group operates in more than 100 countries across six continents with a mission 'To improve the quality of life of the communities we serve globally, through long-term sta...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

General Secretariat GS-DETEC







Tata Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Executive Offices Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for General Secretariat GS-DETEC in 2026.
Incidents vs Executive Offices Industry Avg (This Year)
Tata Group has 96.08% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - General Secretariat GS-DETEC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
General Secretariat GS-DETEC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Tata Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tata Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

General Secretariat GS-DETEC

Tata Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.