Comparison Overview
UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT

UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT
81 Broadway, Ultimo, NSW, 2007, AU
Last Update: 08/12/2025
UTS Engineering and IT is an innovative and research-intensive faculty with a strong reputation for its practice-based learning programs and industry engagement. Our goal is to produce impact-driven, user-centred research outcomes and to incorporate this into our stude...

Stanford University
450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA, US, 94305
Last Update: 13/09/2026
Stanford University pursues its founding mission of research and education with a spirit of optimism and possibility. Stanford catalyzes discoveries, accelerates the human impact of its research, educates students in a culture of expansive inquiry and freedom of thought...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT







Stanford University






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT in 2026.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
Stanford University has 292.16% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Stanford University (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Stanford University cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

UTS Faculty of Engineering and IT

Stanford University
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.