Comparison Overview
Utah Imaging Associates, Inc.

Utah Imaging Associates, Inc.
1433 N 1075 W, Farmington, 84025, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Utah Imaging Associates, Inc. (UIA) was established in 1997, bringing together a group of Board Certified Radiologists along the Wasatch Front whose purpose was and continues to be to provide unsurpassed professional radiology services to both patients and referring phy...

NMC Healthcare
Al Ain Towers, Al Khalidiyah St - Al Bateen - W10, Abu Dhabi, AE
Last Update: 02/09/2026
NMC Healthcare is one of the largest private healthcare networks in the United Arab Emirates. Since 1975, we have provided high quality, personalised, and compassionate care to our patients and are proud to have earned the trust of millions of people in the UAE and arou...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Utah Imaging Associates, Inc.







NMC Healthcare






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Utah Imaging Associates, Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Hospitals and Health Care Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for NMC Healthcare in 2026.
Incident History - Utah Imaging Associates, Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Utah Imaging Associates, Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - NMC Healthcare (X = Date, Y = Severity)
NMC Healthcare cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Utah Imaging Associates, Inc.

NMC Healthcare
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.