Comparison Overview
USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise

USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise
2701 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE, Washington, 20593, US
Last Update: 10/03/2026
Welcome to the USCG Procurement and Contracting Enterprise! We spend ~$3B annually in support of a variety of missions. Here you will find information about doing business with the USCG, best practices and job opportunities.

I WORK FOR SA
200, Victoria Square / Tarndanyangga, Adelaide, 5000, AU
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The OFFICIAL careers page for the South Australian Government. The South Australian Public Sector is the State's largest workforce. We are an employer of choice that reflects the diverse community we serve. Our people are from a range of backgrounds and vocations, fro...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise







I WORK FOR SA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for I WORK FOR SA in 2026.
Incident History - USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise (X = Date, Y = Severity)
USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - I WORK FOR SA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
I WORK FOR SA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

USCG Contracting & Procurement Enterprise

I WORK FOR SA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.