Company Details
us-courts
9,511
90,063
92211
uscourts.gov
0
UNI_2155275
In-progress

United States Courts Company CyberSecurity Posture
uscourts.govThe U.S. Courts, located in courthouses across the nation, safeguard the constitutional rights and liberties of the public. Judges, court clerks, federal public defenders, law clerks, probation and pretrial services officers, technology specialists, human resources and budget specialists, administrative staff, and many others with a variety of skills and talents work in support of this mission. We invite you to learn more about us and join the people who work to help ensure equal justice under the law. About the Courts As Guardians of the Constitution, the U.S. Courts address cases and controversies that can impact the lives of all Americans. The U.S. Courts: - Help individuals and businesses who cannot pay their debts. - Resolve civil disputes involving failure to meet legal agreements. - Decide criminal cases alleging violations of federal criminal laws. - Conduct naturalization ceremonies for new U.S. citizens. - Work with criminal defendants and offenders in the probation and pretrial system. - Provide federal public defenders to those who cannot afford legal counsel. - Call those 18 years and older to serve on juries. - Call witnesses to testify in civil or criminal cases. The U.S. Courts System is comprised of the U.S. Supreme Court; 13 U.S. Courts of Appeals; 94 U.S. District Courts, which include U.S. Bankruptcy Courts; Courts of Special Jurisdiction; U.S. Probation and U.S. Pretrial Services Offices; Federal Public Defenders Offices; and several support agencies, including the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
Company Details
us-courts
9,511
90,063
92211
uscourts.gov
0
UNI_2155275
In-progress
Between 750 and 799

USC Global Score (TPRM)XXXX

Description: A breach in the **United States federal judiciary’s CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) system**, discovered around **July 4**, compromised **sealed court records**, potentially exposing the identities of **confidential informants and cooperating witnesses** across multiple states. The attack forced some courts to revert to **paper-filing backups**, disrupting judicial operations. Reports suggest **Russia-linked hackers** exploited **unpatched software vulnerabilities**—some dating back **five years**—from a prior 2020 breach under the Trump administration. The exposed data may include **criminal dockets, arrest warrants, and sealed indictments**, though the full scope remains unclear over a month after detection. Security experts criticize the lack of transparency and insufficient logging to reconstruct the attack, raising concerns about repeated targeting of a critical judicial system. The breach risks **endangering lives** (e.g., witnesses in sensitive cases) and undermining public trust in federal judicial security.
Description: The U.S. federal judiciary’s **Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) and PACER systems** suffered a **sweeping cyber intrusion**, exposing **sensitive, unclassified data**, including **witness identities and ongoing criminal investigation details**. The breach was exploited by **multiple threat actors**, including **Latin American drug cartels and nation-states**, some of whom maintained **persistent access** for extended periods. The stolen data poses severe risks, as cartels could **weaponize the information**—potentially endangering witnesses, compromising investigations, or leveraging it for blackmail and coercion. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in federal cybersecurity, exacerbated by the **democratization of hacking tools**, which lower the barrier for sophisticated attacks. The **reactive 'education-by-breach' approach** of U.S. agencies has proven inadequate against such **diverse, persistent threats**, necessitating a **centralized, proactive response** like shared incident case studies and coordinated security uplifts. The breach not only jeopardizes **national security** but also erodes public trust in judicial and law enforcement institutions.
Description: The U.S. federal court system experienced a major cyberattack on its case management system, PACER, which contains highly sensitive and sealed documents. The attack exposed vulnerabilities that could have led to the exposure of confidential informants' identities in criminal cases. Officials reported blocking around 200 million harmful cyber events in the 2024 fiscal year, highlighting the persistent and sophisticated nature of the threats. The judiciary is prioritizing security enhancements to mitigate future risks and protect sensitive information.
Description: The US federal judiciary's case management system was breached by sophisticated threat actors, exposing sensitive court documents across multiple states. The attack compromised confidential informants' identities in criminal cases and other protected information, such as minors' details. Nation-state actors are suspected. The judiciary is implementing stricter access controls and working to mitigate the impact on affected litigants. This incident follows previous attacks on court systems, highlighting the judiciary as a prime target for espionage, disruption, and extortion.
Description: Hackers, allegedly Russian, breached the federal judiciary’s case management system, exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities that had persisted for at least five years. The attack resulted in the theft of **sealed case data**, including **national security documents** (potentially exposing sources/methods) and **criminal investigative records** (risking witness safety or suspect evasion). The breach may have allowed adversaries to lurk undetected for years, compromising highly sensitive information entrusted to the courts. The judiciary’s response was criticized for **lack of transparency**, **delayed adoption of phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication**, and **failure to enforce mandatory cybersecurity standards**, with Senator Ron Wyden accusing the institution of **negligence, incompetence, and covering up past incidents**—including a 2020 intrusion by three foreign actors that remains undisclosed. The attack underscores systemic vulnerabilities in an entity responsible for safeguarding critical legal and intelligence data, posing risks to **national security, justice processes, and public trust**.
Description: The U.S. Federal Judiciary confirmed a cyberattack on its electronic case management systems, which host confidential court documents. While most documents are public, sealed filings containing sensitive information, including identities of confidential informants, were exposed. The attack targeted CM/ECF and PACER, the backbone of federal court document management. The Judiciary is enhancing security measures to block future attacks and mitigate the impact on litigants. The breach was discovered on July 4, 2025, and involved sophisticated and persistent cyber threats.
Description: The **Scattered Spider** cybercriminal group, led by **Thalha Jubair (19)**, breached the **U.S. Federal Court Network** in January 2024 via a **helpdesk password reset attack**. After gaining access, the group **compromised multiple accounts**, including those of a **federal judge**, and **stole sensitive personnel data**—names, usernames, phone numbers, titles, and work locations of thousands of court employees. They also **searched for subpoenas** related to their group and **attempted unauthorized access to another magistrate judge’s account**. Additionally, they **used a compromised account to request emergency disclosure of customer financial data** from a third-party provider. The breach exposed **highly sensitive judicial and administrative records**, risking **operational disruption, reputational damage, and potential misuse of stolen identities**. The attack was part of a broader campaign where Scattered Spider **extorted over $115 million** from victims, employing **ransomware and data theft** tactics. The breach **threatened the integrity of federal judicial operations**, with implications for national security given the **targeting of judges and court systems**.
Description: Russian state-backed attackers exploited long-unpatched vulnerabilities (since 2020) in the **CM/ECF/PACER** system—a fragmented, outdated digital filing platform used by U.S. federal courts—to exfiltrate **sealed legal documents, witness identities, and the court system’s internal blueprints**. The breach, part of a **multi-year espionage campaign**, targeted mid-level criminal cases, particularly those involving individuals with Russian/Eastern European surnames. The attackers leveraged the system’s **decentralized, legacy infrastructure** (some components dating to the Windows XP era) to maintain persistent access, compromising sensitive judicial data. While no immediate operational disruption was reported, the intrusion exposed systemic vulnerabilities in critical legal infrastructure, risking **long-term intelligence exploitation, witness endangerment, and erosion of judicial confidentiality**. The attack underscores the **strategic targeting of high-value, poorly secured government systems** by adversarial nation-states.
Description: Corporate Secrets, U.S. federal courts was targeted in a cyberattack that impacted the sensitive information. The compromised information included financial information and trade secrets, including companies’ sales figures, contracts, and product plans. U.S. federal courts immediately secured its networks and informed the impacted members about the breach.


No incidents recorded for United States Courts in 2025.
No incidents recorded for United States Courts in 2025.
No incidents recorded for United States Courts in 2025.
USC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries

The U.S. Courts, located in courthouses across the nation, safeguard the constitutional rights and liberties of the public. Judges, court clerks, federal public defenders, law clerks, probation and pretrial services officers, technology specialists, human resources and budget specialists, administrative staff, and many others with a variety of skills and talents work in support of this mission. We invite you to learn more about us and join the people who work to help ensure equal justice under the law. About the Courts As Guardians of the Constitution, the U.S. Courts address cases and controversies that can impact the lives of all Americans. The U.S. Courts: - Help individuals and businesses who cannot pay their debts. - Resolve civil disputes involving failure to meet legal agreements. - Decide criminal cases alleging violations of federal criminal laws. - Conduct naturalization ceremonies for new U.S. citizens. - Work with criminal defendants and offenders in the probation and pretrial system. - Provide federal public defenders to those who cannot afford legal counsel. - Call those 18 years and older to serve on juries. - Call witnesses to testify in civil or criminal cases. The U.S. Courts System is comprised of the U.S. Supreme Court; 13 U.S. Courts of Appeals; 94 U.S. District Courts, which include U.S. Bankruptcy Courts; Courts of Special Jurisdiction; U.S. Probation and U.S. Pretrial Services Offices; Federal Public Defenders Offices; and several support agencies, including the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission.


The D.C. Courts are comprised of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (DC Superior Court) and the Court System, which provides administrative support to both courts. The D.C. Courts are the third branch of the District of Columbia government. The

El Poder Judicial de Costa Rica, Supremo Poder de la República, tiene la obligación de hacer respetar las leyes y administrar la justicia; objetivo fundamental que le designa la Constitución Política; asimismo, se dirige por las directrices legales establecidas en la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial,

A Sadar Court for the Province of Sindh was established by Bombay Act XII of 1866. This Sadar Court was the Highest Court of appeal for Sindh in Civil and Criminal matters and was presided over by a Judge called the "Judicial Commissioner of Sindh". In 1906 the Bombay Act XII of 1866 was amended by

Despacho de abogados multidisciplinar en El Puerto de Santa María para toda la Bahía de Cádiz. Estamos especializados en: - Herencias y Testamentos - Adopciones, Divorcios, Modificaciones de Medidas, Liquidaciones de Sociedad de Gananciales. - Ejecuciones Hipotecarias. - Arrendamientos, Co

Misión Proporcionar un servicio de administración de Justicia eficaz, eficiente, efectivo, íntegro, oportuno, intercultural y accesible, que contribuya a la paz social y a la seguridad jurídica, afianzando la vigencia del Estado constitucional de derechos y justicia. Visión Consolidar al

The Illinois Supreme Court, in addition to being the state’s highest court, is responsible for the state’s unified trial court, one appellate court with five districts, and several supporting units. General administrative and supervisory authority over the court system is vested in the Supreme Court
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Explore insights on cybersecurity incidents, risk posture, and Rankiteo's assessments.
The official website of United States Courts is http://www.uscourts.gov/.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts’s AI-generated cybersecurity score is 770, reflecting their Fair security posture.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts currently holds 0 security badges, indicating that no recognized compliance certifications are currently verified for the organization.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts is not certified under SOC 2 Type 1.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts does not hold a SOC 2 Type 2 certification.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts is not listed as GDPR compliant.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts does not currently maintain PCI DSS compliance.
According to Rankiteo, United States Courts is not compliant with HIPAA regulations.
According to Rankiteo,United States Courts is not certified under ISO 27001, indicating the absence of a formally recognized information security management framework.
United States Courts operates primarily in the Administration of Justice industry.
United States Courts employs approximately 9,511 people worldwide.
United States Courts presently has no subsidiaries across any sectors.
United States Courts’s official LinkedIn profile has approximately 90,063 followers.
United States Courts is classified under the NAICS code 92211, which corresponds to Courts.
No, United States Courts does not have a profile on Crunchbase.
Yes, United States Courts maintains an official LinkedIn profile, which is actively utilized for branding and talent engagement, which can be accessed here: https://www.linkedin.com/company/us-courts.
As of December 08, 2025, Rankiteo reports that United States Courts has experienced 9 cybersecurity incidents.
United States Courts has an estimated 330 peer or competitor companies worldwide.
Incident Types: The types of cybersecurity incidents that have occurred include Cyber Attack and Breach.
Total Financial Loss: The total financial loss from these incidents is estimated to be $115 million.
Detection and Response: The company detects and responds to cybersecurity incidents through an containment measures with secured its networks, and communication strategy with informed the impacted members about the breach, and incident response plan activated with yes, and containment measures with restricting access to sensitive documents, and remediation measures with implementing more rigorous procedures for document access, and and containment measures with stricter access controls, and remediation measures with enhancing security of the system, and recovery measures with working with courts to mitigate impact on litigants, and communication strategy with published statement, and and and and incident response plan activated with confirmed by administrative office of the us courts (august 5 disclosure), incident response plan activated with norwegian pst (domestic intelligence agency) investigation, and law enforcement notified with norwegian pst, law enforcement notified with us department of justice (implied, though no response confirmed), and communication strategy with public disclosure by us courts (august 5), communication strategy with statements by norwegian pst (via local media), and incident response plan activated with yes (partial; backup paper-filing activated), and law enforcement notified with likely (given federal nature, but not publicly confirmed), and containment measures with isolation of affected cm/ecf components, containment measures with transition to manual filings, and remediation measures with investigation into unpatched vulnerabilities, remediation measures with potential system overhaul (not yet confirmed), and communication strategy with limited public disclosures (via media leaks), communication strategy with no official federal statement as of august 2024, and enhanced monitoring with likely (but not detailed publicly), and law enforcement notified with likely (given federal judiciary involvement), and communication strategy with public disclosure via analysis (lawfare article), communication strategy with likely internal federal briefings, and enhanced monitoring with recommended as part of proposed 'coordinated security uplift', and incident response plan activated with yes (vague 'steps to improve cybersecurity' mentioned), and third party assistance with collaboration with congress, third party assistance with federal agencies (unspecified), and communication strategy with public statement on 2024-08-07 (limited details), communication strategy with no response to 2020 intrusion disclosure, and incident response plan activated with yes (fbi, doj, and international law enforcement), and third party assistance with u.k. national crime agency, third party assistance with west midlands police, third party assistance with city of london police, third party assistance with agencies in canada, romania, australia, and the netherlands, and law enforcement notified with yes (fbi, doj, u.k. authorities), and containment measures with seizure of servers and cryptocurrency wallets ($36m), containment measures with shutdown of scattered spider's telegram channel, and communication strategy with doj complaint unsealing, communication strategy with public statements by fbi/doj officials, communication strategy with media coverage of arrests..
Title: Cyberattack on U.S. Federal Courts
Description: Corporate Secrets, U.S. federal courts was targeted in a cyberattack that impacted sensitive information. The compromised information included financial information and trade secrets, including companies’ sales figures, contracts, and product plans. U.S. federal courts immediately secured its networks and informed the impacted members about the breach.
Type: Data Breach
Title: Cyberattack on US Federal Judiciary Case Management System
Description: The US federal judiciary announced stronger cybersecurity protections for sensitive court documents following escalated cyber-attacks on its case management system. The breach exposed sensitive court documents in multiple US states, with nation-state actors suspected of involvement.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-07
Type: Data Breach
Threat Actor: Nation-state actors (suspected)
Motivation: Espionage, disruption, or influence
Title: Cyberattack on U.S. Federal Judiciary's Electronic Case Management Systems
Description: The U.S. Federal Judiciary confirms that it suffered a cyberattack on its electronic case management systems hosting confidential court documents and is strengthening cybersecurity measures.
Date Detected: 2025-07-04
Type: Cyberattack
Title: Cyberattack on U.S. Federal Court's Case Management System
Description: U.S. federal court officials reported escalated cyberattacks on their case management system, potentially exposing sensitive documents and confidential informant identities. The system, PACER, is considered highly vulnerable and in need of replacement due to cyber risks.
Type: Cyberattack, Data Breach
Title: Transatlantic Cyberattacks on US Federal Court System and Norwegian Dam by Russian Actors
Description: Russian-linked attackers compromised the US federal court's outdated CM/ECF case-management system, exfiltrating sealed documents, witness identities, and system blueprints over a years-long campaign. Concurrently, suspected Russian cyber operators seized control of a Norwegian dam (Bremanger) for four hours, releasing 500 liters of water per second in a demonstrative attack aimed at instilling fear. Both incidents highlight vulnerabilities in critical Western infrastructure, with US and Norwegian authorities attributing the attacks to Kremlin-aligned actors.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-05
Type: Cyber Espionage
Attack Vector: Exploitation of Unpatched Vulnerabilities (since 2020)Compromised Credentials (implied for court system)Remote Access to Industrial Control Systems (dam)
Vulnerability Exploited: Legacy System Vulnerabilities (CM/ECF/PACER platforms, some running on outdated Windows XP-era software)Unspecified bugs in dam control systems
Threat Actor: Russian State-Sponsored Actors (suspected)Kremlin-Aligned Cyber Groups
Motivation: Espionage (US court documents, particularly cases involving Russian/Eastern European surnames)Demonstration of Capability (Norwegian dam attack to instill fear)Geopolitical Signaling
Title: Breach of the United States Federal Judiciary’s Electronic Case Filing System (CM/ECF)
Description: A cybersecurity breach of the United States federal judiciary’s **Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF)** system was discovered around **July 4**. The incident compromised **sealed court records** and may have exposed the identities of **confidential informants and cooperating witnesses** across multiple U.S. states. Some courts reverted to **backup paper-filing plans** as a result. The breach exploited **unpatched software vulnerabilities** first identified **five years ago** during a **2020 incident** under the first Trump administration. Reports suggest **Russian involvement**, but details on affected data and systems remain unclear over a month after discovery. The compromised system manages **criminal dockets, arrest warrants, and sealed indictments**.
Date Detected: 2024-07-04 (approximate)
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-06 (via Politico and The New York Times reports)
Type: Data Breach
Attack Vector: Exploitation of unpatched software vulnerabilities (known since 2019)Potential state-sponsored (Russia alleged)
Vulnerability Exploited: Unaddressed software vulnerabilities in CM/ECF system (identified in 2019 after a prior 2020 breach)
Threat Actor: Allegedly linked to Russia (unconfirmed)State-sponsored actors (suspected)
Motivation: EspionageIntelligence gatheringCompromise of sensitive legal proceedings
Title: Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Federal Judiciary’s CM/ECF and PACER Systems
Description: A sweeping cyber intrusion exposed sensitive, unclassified information in the U.S. federal judiciary’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) and PACER systems. The breach revealed witness identities and details of ongoing criminal investigations, raising concerns about Latin American drug cartels weaponizing the stolen data. Multiple nation-states and criminal groups simultaneously breached these systems, with some maintaining prolonged access. The incident underscores systemic vulnerabilities in U.S. federal agencies, exacerbated by the 'democratization of hacking' and a reactive 'education-by-breach' cybersecurity approach. Current strategies, including offensive cyber operations, are deemed insufficient against the diverse threat landscape.
Type: Cyber Espionage
Attack Vector: Unknown (likely multi-vector due to diverse threat actors)Potential exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure
Vulnerability Exploited: Systemic weaknesses in U.S. federal cybersecurity postureLack of proactive threat detection and centralized incident response
Threat Actor: Latin American Drug Cartels (potential weaponization of data)Multiple Nation-StatesVarious Criminal Groups
Motivation: EspionageCriminal Exploitation (e.g., witness intimidation, investigation sabotage)Financial Gain (potential dark web data sales)Strategic Advantage (nation-state actors)
Title: Federal Court Cybersecurity Breach Involving Sealed Case Data
Description: Hackers, allegedly Russian, breached and stole sealed case data from federal district courts dating back to at least July 2024, exploiting vulnerabilities left unfixed for five years. The breach follows a 2020 intrusion by three hostile foreign actors, which remains undisclosed in detail. Sen. Ron Wyden accused the judiciary of negligence, incompetence, and covering up failures, urging Chief Justice John Roberts to seek an independent review by the National Academy of Sciences. The judiciary's slow adoption of non-phishing-resistant multifactor authentication and lack of accountability were highlighted as key issues. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts acknowledged the attack but provided vague details about remediation efforts.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-08-07
Type: data breach
Attack Vector: exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilitiespersistent access (potentially years)weak multifactor authentication
Vulnerability Exploited: Unpatched vulnerabilities in the case management system (left unfixed for ~5 years)
Threat Actor: Alleged Russian hackers (same group linked to a prior 2020 intrusion)
Motivation: cyberespionagenational security compromisepotential witness/defendant targeting
Title: Scattered Spider Cybercriminal Operation Extorts $115M, Breaches U.S. Federal Court Network
Description: A Justice Department complaint revealed that the Scattered Spider cybercriminal group, including U.K. national Thalha Jubair (19), conducted at least 120 cyberattacks over three years, extorting at least $115 million from victims, including 47 U.S. entities. The group breached the U.S. federal court network via helpdesk social engineering, stealing personnel data and searching for subpoenas. Jubair was arrested in London and faces U.S. charges for conspiracies involving computer fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. The group's tactics included calling help desks to reset passwords, taking over administrative accounts, and encrypting systems after data theft. Evidence tied Jubair to servers, cryptocurrency wallets (including $36M seized), Telegram accounts, and gaming/food delivery purchases. The group also targeted Transport for London and industries like insurance, retail, and aviation.
Date Publicly Disclosed: 2024-07-18
Type: Cyber Extortion
Attack Vector: Helpdesk Impersonation (Password Reset)Credential TheftAdministrative Account TakeoverData ExfiltrationSystem Encryption
Vulnerability Exploited: Weak Helpdesk AuthenticationLack of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)Human Error (Social Engineering)
Threat Actor: Scattered SpiderThalha Jubair (19, U.K. national)Owen Flowers (18, U.K. national)Unnamed U.S.-based co-conspirator
Motivation: Financial GainData Theft for ExtortionDisruption of Critical Infrastructure
Common Attack Types: The most common types of attacks the company has faced is Breach.
Identification of Attack Vectors: The company identifies the attack vectors used in incidents through Exploited vulnerabilities in CM/ECF system (US)Compromised dam control system credentials/access (Norway), Exploited unpatched vulnerabilities in CM/ECF system (2019-era flaws), unpatched vulnerabilities in case management system and Helpdesk password reset requests.

Data Compromised: Financial information, Trade secrets, Sales figures, Contracts, Product plans

Data Compromised: Confidential court documents, identities of confidential informants
Systems Affected: Federal core case management system
Operational Impact: Mitigation efforts to restrict access to sensitive documents
Brand Reputation Impact: Potential distrust in the US government
Identity Theft Risk: High (confidential informants and protected identities)

Data Compromised: Sensitive case documents, Identities of confidential informants
Systems Affected: CM/ECFPACER
Operational Impact: Mitigation efforts with courts to reduce impact on litigants
Identity Theft Risk: High

Data Compromised: Sensitive documents, Potential exposure of confidential informant identities
Systems Affected: Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)

Data Compromised: Sealed court documents, Witness identities, Us court system blueprints, Midlevel criminal case files (nyc and other jurisdictions)
Systems Affected: US Courts' CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) systemPACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)Bremanger Dam Control Systems (Norway)
Downtime: ['4 hours (Bremanger dam valves held open)']
Operational Impact: Disruption of dam operations (Norway)Potential compromise of legal proceedings (US)Loss of control over sensitive case materials
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in US federal court system securityPerception of vulnerability in Norwegian critical infrastructure
Legal Liabilities: Potential violations of confidentiality for sealed court casesRisk of compromised legal proceedings
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (witness identities exposed)']

Data Compromised: Sealed court records, Confidential informant identities, Cooperating witness identities, Criminal dockets, Arrest warrants, Sealed indictments
Systems Affected: Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) systemBackup paper-filing systems (activated as contingency)
Downtime: Ongoing (as of August 2024, partial disruptions persist)
Operational Impact: Court operations disruptedTransition to manual paper filingsDelayed legal proceedings
Brand Reputation Impact: Erosion of public trust in federal judiciary cybersecurityCriticism over repeated breaches (2020 and 2024)
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits from exposed individuals (e.g., informants, witnesses)Violations of confidentiality agreements
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for confidential informants and witnesses)', 'Risk of retaliation or physical harm']

Data Compromised: Witness identities, Details of ongoing criminal investigations, Sensitive unclassified judicial records
Systems Affected: Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF)Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)
Operational Impact: Compromised integrity of judicial proceedingsRisk to witness safetyErosion of trust in federal judiciary cybersecurity
Brand Reputation Impact: Severe damage to public trust in U.S. federal judiciary’s ability to protect sensitive dataPerception of systemic cybersecurity failures across federal agencies
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (for witnesses and individuals involved in criminal cases)']

Data Compromised: Sealed case data, Potential national security documents, Criminal charging/investigative documents
Systems Affected: federal district court case management system
Operational Impact: compromised confidentiality of sensitive legal proceedingsrisk to sources/methods in national security casespotential witness/defendant endangerment
Brand Reputation Impact: eroded public trust in federal judiciary's cybersecurityaccusations of negligence/cover-up by Sen. Wyden

Financial Loss: $115 million (ransom payments)
Data Compromised: Personnel data (names, usernames, telephone numbers), Federal judge subpoenas, Thousands of names, titles, and work locations of u.s. courts users, Customer account information (requested via financial services provider)
Systems Affected: U.S. Federal Court NetworkSeven victim companies (unnamed)Transport for London (2023)47 U.S. entitiesCompanies in insurance, retail, and aviation industries
Operational Impact: Widespread disruption to U.S. businessesDisruption to critical infrastructureFederal court system compromiseEmergency disclosure requests to financial services providers
Brand Reputation Impact: High (targeting of federal systems and critical infrastructure)Public association with Scattered Spider's high-profile attacks
Legal Liabilities: Potential lawsuits from affected entitiesRegulatory scrutiny for U.S. Courts and victim companies
Identity Theft Risk: ['High (PII of court personnel and users exposed)']
Payment Information Risk: ['Moderate (customer account information requested via financial services provider)']
Average Financial Loss: The average financial loss per incident is $12.78 million.
Commonly Compromised Data Types: The types of data most commonly compromised in incidents are Financial Information, Trade Secrets, Sales Figures, Contracts, Product Plans, , Confidential court documents, identities of confidential informants, Sensitive Case Documents, Identities Of Confidential Informants, , Sensitive Documents, Sealed Materials, , Sealed Legal Documents, Witness Identities, Court System Architectural Blueprints, Case Files (Including Those With Russian/Eastern European Surnames), , Legal Documents, Sealed Records, Personally Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Informants/Witnesses, Criminal Case Details, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii) Of Witnesses, Criminal Investigation Details, Unclassified Judicial Records, , Sealed Court Records, National Security Documents, Criminal Investigative Files, , Personally Identifiable Information (Pii), Employment Records, Judicial Subpoenas, Customer Account Information and .

Entity Name: U.S. Federal Courts
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Judiciary
Location: United States

Entity Name: Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC)
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Judicial
Location: United States

Entity Name: U.S. Federal Judiciary
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Judicial
Location: United States

Entity Name: U.S. Federal Courts
Entity Type: Government
Industry: Judicial
Location: United States

Entity Name: Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Judicial/Legal
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Lawyers, Court personnel, Individuals involved in sealed cases (particularly those with Russian/Eastern European surnames)

Entity Name: Bremanger Dam
Entity Type: Critical Infrastructure
Industry: Energy/Water Management
Location: Bremanger, Norway
Customers Affected: Local population downstream of the dam, Norwegian water management authorities

Entity Name: United States Federal Judiciary
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Judicial/Legal
Location: United States (multiple states)
Size: Federal-level (all U.S. district courts using CM/ECF)
Customers Affected: Confidential informants, Cooperating witnesses, Defendants in sealed cases, Legal professionals

Entity Name: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC)
Entity Type: Federal Government Agency
Industry: Judicial/Legal
Location: United States
Size: Large (federal-scale operations)
Customers Affected: Judges, Prosecutors, Defendants, Witnesses, Legal professionals, General public accessing court records

Entity Name: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Entity Type: federal agency
Industry: judicial/government
Location: United States

Entity Name: United States Courts
Entity Type: Federal Government
Industry: Judicial/Legal
Location: United States
Customers Affected: Thousands (court personnel and users)

Entity Name: Transport for London
Entity Type: Government Agency
Industry: Transportation
Location: United Kingdom

Entity Name: 47 Unnamed U.S. Entities
Entity Type: Private Companies, Critical Infrastructure
Industry: Insurance, Retail, Aviation, Others
Location: United States

Entity Name: Seven Victim Companies (from complaint)

Containment Measures: secured its networks
Communication Strategy: informed the impacted members about the breach

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes
Containment Measures: Restricting access to sensitive documents
Remediation Measures: Implementing more rigorous procedures for document access

Incident Response Plan Activated: True
Containment Measures: Stricter access controls
Remediation Measures: Enhancing security of the system
Recovery Measures: Working with courts to mitigate impact on litigants
Communication Strategy: Published statement

Incident Response Plan Activated: True

Incident Response Plan Activated: ['Confirmed by Administrative Office of the US Courts (August 5 disclosure)', 'Norwegian PST (domestic intelligence agency) investigation']
Law Enforcement Notified: Norwegian PST, US Department of Justice (implied, though no response confirmed),
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure by US Courts (August 5)Statements by Norwegian PST (via local media)

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (partial; backup paper-filing activated)
Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (given federal nature, but not publicly confirmed)
Containment Measures: Isolation of affected CM/ECF componentsTransition to manual filings
Remediation Measures: Investigation into unpatched vulnerabilitiesPotential system overhaul (not yet confirmed)
Communication Strategy: Limited public disclosures (via media leaks)No official federal statement as of August 2024
Enhanced Monitoring: Likely (but not detailed publicly)

Law Enforcement Notified: Likely (given federal judiciary involvement),
Communication Strategy: Public disclosure via analysis (Lawfare article)Likely internal federal briefings
Enhanced Monitoring: Recommended as part of proposed 'coordinated security uplift'

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (vague 'steps to improve cybersecurity' mentioned)
Third Party Assistance: Collaboration With Congress, Federal Agencies (Unspecified).
Communication Strategy: public statement on 2024-08-07 (limited details)no response to 2020 intrusion disclosure

Incident Response Plan Activated: Yes (FBI, DOJ, and international law enforcement)
Third Party Assistance: U.K. National Crime Agency, West Midlands Police, City Of London Police, Agencies In Canada, Romania, Australia, And The Netherlands.
Law Enforcement Notified: Yes (FBI, DOJ, U.K. authorities)
Containment Measures: Seizure of servers and cryptocurrency wallets ($36M)Shutdown of Scattered Spider's Telegram channel
Communication Strategy: DOJ complaint unsealingPublic statements by FBI/DOJ officialsMedia coverage of arrests
Incident Response Plan: The company's incident response plan is described as Yes, , , Confirmed by Administrative Office of the US Courts (August 5 disclosure), Norwegian PST (domestic intelligence agency) investigation, , Yes (partial; backup paper-filing activated), Yes (vague 'steps to improve cybersecurity' mentioned), Yes (FBI, DOJ, and international law enforcement).
Third-Party Assistance: The company involves third-party assistance in incident response through collaboration with Congress, federal agencies (unspecified), , U.K. National Crime Agency, West Midlands Police, City of London Police, Agencies in Canada, Romania, Australia, and the Netherlands, .

Type of Data Compromised: Financial information, Trade secrets, Sales figures, Contracts, Product plans
Sensitivity of Data: High

Type of Data Compromised: Confidential court documents, identities of confidential informants
Sensitivity of Data: High
Data Exfiltration: Yes
Personally Identifiable Information: Yes

Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive case documents, Identities of confidential informants
Sensitivity of Data: High

Type of Data Compromised: Sensitive documents, Sealed materials
Sensitivity of Data: high

Type of Data Compromised: Sealed legal documents, Witness identities, Court system architectural blueprints, Case files (including those with russian/eastern european surnames)
Sensitivity of Data: High (sealed indictments, witness protection details, system blueprints)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (US court documents)Unspecified for Norwegian dam (though control was seized)
File Types Exposed: PDF (legal documents)Database records (case files)System diagrams (blueprints)
Personally Identifiable Information: Witness identitiesNames/details from criminal cases

Type of Data Compromised: Legal documents, Sealed records, Personally identifiable information (pii) of informants/witnesses, Criminal case details
Sensitivity of Data: Extremely High (national security, witness protection, ongoing investigations)
Data Exfiltration: Suspected (but unconfirmed)
File Types Exposed: PDF (court filings)Database records (case management)Text documents (indictments, warrants)
Personally Identifiable Information: Names of confidential informantsWitness identitiesCase participant details

Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii) of witnesses, Criminal investigation details, Unclassified judicial records
Sensitivity of Data: High (potential to endanger lives, compromise investigations)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (data stolen by multiple actors)
File Types Exposed: Case filesWitness statementsInvestigation documents
Personally Identifiable Information: Witness identitiesPossibly addresses, contact details, or other PII linked to criminal cases

Type of Data Compromised: Sealed court records, National security documents, Criminal investigative files
Sensitivity of Data: High (includes classified/national security and legally sensitive materials)
Data Exfiltration: Confirmed (stolen sealed case data)

Type of Data Compromised: Personally identifiable information (pii), Employment records, Judicial subpoenas, Customer account information
Number of Records Exposed: Thousands (exact number unspecified)
Sensitivity of Data: High (includes PII of federal employees and judicial records)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (downloaded from U.S. Courts network)
Data Encryption: Yes (used in ransomware attacks)
File Types Exposed: Personnel databasesEmail inboxes (including federal judges)Subpoena documents
Personally Identifiable Information: NamesUsernamesTelephone numbersTitlesWork locations
Prevention of Data Exfiltration: The company takes the following measures to prevent data exfiltration: Implementing more rigorous procedures for document access, Enhancing security of the system, Investigation into unpatched vulnerabilities, Potential system overhaul (not yet confirmed), .
Handling of PII Incidents: The company handles incidents involving personally identifiable information (PII) through by secured its networks, , restricting access to sensitive documents, stricter access controls, isolation of affected cm/ecf components, transition to manual filings, , seizure of servers and cryptocurrency wallets ($36m), shutdown of scattered spider's telegram channel and .

Data Exfiltration: ['Yes (US court system)']

Data Exfiltration: Possible (motive aligns with espionage)

Data Exfiltration: ['Yes (primary objective of intrusion)']

Ransom Demanded: ['$25 million (one victim)', '$36.2 million (another victim)', 'Total: $115 million across all victims']
Ransom Paid: $115 million (total across all victims)
Data Encryption: Yes (critical systems encrypted after data theft)
Data Exfiltration: Yes (double extortion tactic)
Data Recovery from Ransomware: The company recovers data encrypted by ransomware through Working with courts to mitigate impact on litigants.

Regulations Violated: Potential violations of US federal rules on sealed court documents (e.g., Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) for grand jury secrecy), Norwegian critical infrastructure protection laws,
Regulatory Notifications: Disclosure to US Congress/oversight bodies (implied)Norwegian government notifications

Regulations Violated: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (sealed records), Potential violations of the **Privacy Act of 1974** (PII exposure), Judicial Conference policies on data security,
Legal Actions: Potential congressional hearings, Internal judicial reviews,
Regulatory Notifications: Likely notified to **Department of Justice (DOJ)** and **Homeland Security (DHS)**

Regulations Violated: Potential violations of Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), Possible non-compliance with judicial data protection policies,
Regulatory Notifications: Likely notifications to Congress, Department of Justice, and other oversight bodies

Regulations Violated: potential violations of federal cybersecurity mandates (unspecified), failure to meet basic cybersecurity best practices,
Legal Actions: Sen. Wyden's call for independent review by National Academy of Sciences,

Legal Actions: U.S. charges against Thalha Jubair (computer fraud, wire fraud, money laundering), Potential extradition from U.K., Up to 95 years in prison if convicted,
Regulatory Notifications: DOJ complaint filingFBI statementsInternational law enforcement coordination
Ensuring Regulatory Compliance: The company ensures compliance with regulatory requirements through Potential congressional hearings, Internal judicial reviews, , Sen. Wyden's call for independent review by National Academy of Sciences, , U.S. charges against Thalha Jubair (computer fraud, wire fraud, money laundering), Potential extradition from U.K., Up to 95 years in prison if convicted, .

Lessons Learned: Legacy systems (e.g., Windows XP-era software) in critical infrastructure pose severe risks., Nation-state actors exploit long-standing vulnerabilities for espionage and sabotage., Industrial control systems (e.g., dams) are targets for demonstrative attacks., Decentralized systems (e.g., 200+ local CM/ECF instances) complicate security., Pro-Russian cyber activity is escalating in both stealth (US) and spectacle (Norway).

Lessons Learned: Failure to patch known vulnerabilities leads to repeated breaches., Federal systems require **real-time logging and forensic capabilities** to reconstruct attacks., Transparency gaps undermine public trust in judicial cybersecurity., State-sponsored threats demand **proactive threat hunting** in critical infrastructure.

Lessons Learned: Reactive 'education-by-breach' approach is insufficient for modern threats., Democratization of hacking tools lowers the barrier for sophisticated attacks., Diverse threat actors (nation-states, cartels, criminals) require a unified defense strategy., Centralized incident response and shared case studies could improve federal cybersecurity posture., Offensive cyber operations alone cannot mitigate systemic vulnerabilities.

Lessons Learned: Delayed adoption of phishing-resistant MFA creates critical vulnerabilities., Lack of transparency with Congress/public exacerbates reputational damage., Independent oversight may be necessary for federal judiciary cybersecurity., Unpatched vulnerabilities (even years old) remain high-risk targets.

Lessons Learned: Helpdesk authentication processes are critical targets for social engineering attacks., Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is essential for administrative accounts., Cryptocurrency transactions can be traced to identify threat actors., Telegram and gaming platforms can serve as evidence sources in investigations., Collaboration between international law enforcement agencies is vital for disrupting cybercriminal networks.

Recommendations: Replace PACER with a more cyber-secure system

Recommendations: Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g., dam valve changes)., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors.Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g., dam valve changes)., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors.Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g., dam valve changes)., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors.Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g., dam valve changes)., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors.Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g., dam valve changes)., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors.Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g., dam valve changes)., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors.

Recommendations: Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems., Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach.Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems., Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach.Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems., Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach.Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems., Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach.Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems., Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach.

Recommendations: Implement a 'coordinated security uplift' across federal agencies., Develop and share incident case studies to proactively address threats., Move beyond reactive measures to predictive, intelligence-driven cybersecurity., Enhance monitoring and detection capabilities for prolonged intrusions., Address the root causes of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure.Implement a 'coordinated security uplift' across federal agencies., Develop and share incident case studies to proactively address threats., Move beyond reactive measures to predictive, intelligence-driven cybersecurity., Enhance monitoring and detection capabilities for prolonged intrusions., Address the root causes of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure.Implement a 'coordinated security uplift' across federal agencies., Develop and share incident case studies to proactively address threats., Move beyond reactive measures to predictive, intelligence-driven cybersecurity., Enhance monitoring and detection capabilities for prolonged intrusions., Address the root causes of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure.Implement a 'coordinated security uplift' across federal agencies., Develop and share incident case studies to proactively address threats., Move beyond reactive measures to predictive, intelligence-driven cybersecurity., Enhance monitoring and detection capabilities for prolonged intrusions., Address the root causes of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure.Implement a 'coordinated security uplift' across federal agencies., Develop and share incident case studies to proactively address threats., Move beyond reactive measures to predictive, intelligence-driven cybersecurity., Enhance monitoring and detection capabilities for prolonged intrusions., Address the root causes of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure.

Recommendations: Mandate phishing-resistant multifactor authentication across all federal court systems., Conduct an independent cybersecurity audit (e.g., by National Academy of Sciences)., Implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary (currently voluntary)., Disclose details of the 2020 intrusion and other past breaches to restore accountability., Accelerate patch management for critical vulnerabilities in case management systems.Mandate phishing-resistant multifactor authentication across all federal court systems., Conduct an independent cybersecurity audit (e.g., by National Academy of Sciences)., Implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary (currently voluntary)., Disclose details of the 2020 intrusion and other past breaches to restore accountability., Accelerate patch management for critical vulnerabilities in case management systems.Mandate phishing-resistant multifactor authentication across all federal court systems., Conduct an independent cybersecurity audit (e.g., by National Academy of Sciences)., Implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary (currently voluntary)., Disclose details of the 2020 intrusion and other past breaches to restore accountability., Accelerate patch management for critical vulnerabilities in case management systems.Mandate phishing-resistant multifactor authentication across all federal court systems., Conduct an independent cybersecurity audit (e.g., by National Academy of Sciences)., Implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary (currently voluntary)., Disclose details of the 2020 intrusion and other past breaches to restore accountability., Accelerate patch management for critical vulnerabilities in case management systems.Mandate phishing-resistant multifactor authentication across all federal court systems., Conduct an independent cybersecurity audit (e.g., by National Academy of Sciences)., Implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary (currently voluntary)., Disclose details of the 2020 intrusion and other past breaches to restore accountability., Accelerate patch management for critical vulnerabilities in case management systems.

Recommendations: Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities.
Key Lessons Learned: The key lessons learned from past incidents are Legacy systems (e.g., Windows XP-era software) in critical infrastructure pose severe risks.,Nation-state actors exploit long-standing vulnerabilities for espionage and sabotage.,Industrial control systems (e.g., dams) are targets for demonstrative attacks.,Decentralized systems (e.g., 200+ local CM/ECF instances) complicate security.,Pro-Russian cyber activity is escalating in both stealth (US) and spectacle (Norway).Failure to patch known vulnerabilities leads to repeated breaches.,Federal systems require **real-time logging and forensic capabilities** to reconstruct attacks.,Transparency gaps undermine public trust in judicial cybersecurity.,State-sponsored threats demand **proactive threat hunting** in critical infrastructure.Reactive 'education-by-breach' approach is insufficient for modern threats.,Democratization of hacking tools lowers the barrier for sophisticated attacks.,Diverse threat actors (nation-states, cartels, criminals) require a unified defense strategy.,Centralized incident response and shared case studies could improve federal cybersecurity posture.,Offensive cyber operations alone cannot mitigate systemic vulnerabilities.Delayed adoption of phishing-resistant MFA creates critical vulnerabilities.,Lack of transparency with Congress/public exacerbates reputational damage.,Independent oversight may be necessary for federal judiciary cybersecurity.,Unpatched vulnerabilities (even years old) remain high-risk targets.Helpdesk authentication processes are critical targets for social engineering attacks.,Multi-factor authentication (MFA) is essential for administrative accounts.,Cryptocurrency transactions can be traced to identify threat actors.,Telegram and gaming platforms can serve as evidence sources in investigations.,Collaboration between international law enforcement agencies is vital for disrupting cybercriminal networks.
Implemented Recommendations: The company has implemented the following recommendations to improve cybersecurity: Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems. and Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF..

Source: Politico

Source: BleepingComputer

Source: Politico

Source: Norwegian PST (via local media)

Source: Politico
URL: https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/federal-courts-hack-russia-00172345
Date Accessed: 2024-08-07

Source: The New York Times
URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/06/us/politics/federal-courts-hack-russia.html
Date Accessed: 2024-08-07

Source: Hunter Strategy (Jake Williams, former NSA hacker)
Date Accessed: 2024-08-07

Source: Lawfare

Source: Sen. Ron Wyden's letter to Chief Justice John Roberts
Date Accessed: 2024-08-19

Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts public statement
Date Accessed: 2024-08-07

Source: 2020 House Judiciary Chair Jerrold Nadler disclosure (referenced by Wyden)

Source: U.S. Department of Justice
Date Accessed: 2024-07-18

Source: FBI Statement (Brett Leatherman)
Date Accessed: 2024-07-18

Source: Westminster Magistrates Court Records (Thalha Jubair and Owen Flowers)
Date Accessed: 2024-07-18
Additional Resources: Stakeholders can find additional resources on cybersecurity best practices at and Source: PoliticoDate Accessed: 2024-08-06, and Source: Politico, and Source: BleepingComputer, and Source: Politico, and Source: The RegisterUrl: https://www.theregister.com, and Source: New York TimesUrl: https://www.nytimes.com, and Source: Norwegian PST (via local media), and Source: PoliticoUrl: https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/federal-courts-hack-russia-00172345Date Accessed: 2024-08-07, and Source: The New York TimesUrl: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/06/us/politics/federal-courts-hack-russia.htmlDate Accessed: 2024-08-07, and Source: Hunter Strategy (Jake Williams, former NSA hacker)Date Accessed: 2024-08-07, and Source: LawfareUrl: https://www.lawfareblog.com/drug-cartels-are-new-apts, and Source: Sen. Ron Wyden's letter to Chief Justice John RobertsDate Accessed: 2024-08-19, and Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts public statementDate Accessed: 2024-08-07, and Source: 2020 House Judiciary Chair Jerrold Nadler disclosure (referenced by Wyden), and Source: U.S. Department of JusticeDate Accessed: 2024-07-18, and Source: FBI Statement (Brett Leatherman)Date Accessed: 2024-07-18, and Source: Westminster Magistrates Court Records (Thalha Jubair and Owen Flowers)Date Accessed: 2024-07-18.

Investigation Status: Ongoing

Investigation Status: Ongoing

Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (US Department of Justice)', 'Active (Norwegian PST)']

Investigation Status: Ongoing (as of August 2024; no official findings released)

Investigation Status: ['Ongoing (implied by article’s call for improved response)', 'Likely classified details due to national security implications']

Investigation Status: Ongoing (Sen. Wyden demands independent review; judiciary response vague)

Investigation Status: Ongoing (Jubair arrested; extradition efforts pending; additional co-conspirators under investigation)
Communication of Investigation Status: The company communicates the status of incident investigations to stakeholders through Informed The Impacted Members About The Breach, Published statement, Public Disclosure By Us Courts (August 5), Statements By Norwegian Pst (Via Local Media), Limited Public Disclosures (Via Media Leaks), No Official Federal Statement As Of August 2024, Public Disclosure Via Analysis (Lawfare Article), Likely Internal Federal Briefings, Public Statement On 2024-08-07 (Limited Details), No Response To 2020 Intrusion Disclosure, Doj Complaint Unsealing, Public Statements By Fbi/Doj Officials and Media Coverage Of Arrests.

Stakeholder Advisories: Us Legal Community Warned Of Potential Compromise Of Sealed Cases., Norwegian Critical Infrastructure Operators Advised To Audit Control Systems..
Customer Advisories: Lawyers using CM/ECF/PACER advised to monitor for unusual activity.Norwegian public reassured that dam attack caused no lasting damage but demonstrated vulnerability.

Stakeholder Advisories: Judicial Conference Of The United States (Internal), Department Of Justice (Likely Involved).
Customer Advisories: None publicly issued to affected individuals (e.g., informants/witnesses)

Stakeholder Advisories: Federal Judiciary Branches, U.S. Department Of Justice, Congressional Oversight Committees, Law Enforcement Agencies Involved In Affected Cases.
Customer Advisories: Legal professionals using CM/ECF and PACERWitnesses and individuals involved in compromised cases

Stakeholder Advisories: Doj And Fbi Warnings About Scattered Spider Tactics, Advisories To Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
Advisories Provided: The company provides the following advisories to stakeholders and customers following an incident: were Us Legal Community Warned Of Potential Compromise Of Sealed Cases., Norwegian Critical Infrastructure Operators Advised To Audit Control Systems., Lawyers Using Cm/Ecf/Pacer Advised To Monitor For Unusual Activity., Norwegian Public Reassured That Dam Attack Caused No Lasting Damage But Demonstrated Vulnerability., , Judicial Conference Of The United States (Internal), Department Of Justice (Likely Involved), None Publicly Issued To Affected Individuals (E.G., Informants/Witnesses), , Federal Judiciary Branches, U.S. Department Of Justice, Congressional Oversight Committees, Law Enforcement Agencies Involved In Affected Cases, Legal Professionals Using Cm/Ecf And Pacer, Witnesses And Individuals Involved In Compromised Cases, , Doj And Fbi Warnings About Scattered Spider Tactics and Advisories To Critical Infrastructure Sectors.

High Value Targets: Confidential court documents
Data Sold on Dark Web: Confidential court documents

Entry Point: Exploited Vulnerabilities In Cm/Ecf System (Us), Compromised Dam Control System Credentials/Access (Norway),
Reconnaissance Period: ['Years-long (US court system)', "Unspecified (Norway, but part of a 'change in activity over the past year')"]
High Value Targets: Sealed Indictments (Us), Witness Identities (Us), Dam Control Mechanisms (Norway),
Data Sold on Dark Web: Sealed Indictments (Us), Witness Identities (Us), Dam Control Mechanisms (Norway),

Entry Point: Exploited unpatched vulnerabilities in CM/ECF system (2019-era flaws)
Reconnaissance Period: Unknown (potentially years, given 2020 breach history)
High Value Targets: Sealed Indictments, Confidential Informant Databases, Ongoing Criminal Investigations,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Sealed Indictments, Confidential Informant Databases, Ongoing Criminal Investigations,

Reconnaissance Period: ['Potentially extended (some actors maintained access for prolonged periods)']
Backdoors Established: ['Likely (given prolonged access by multiple actors)']
High Value Targets: Witness Data, Ongoing Criminal Investigations, Judicial Proceedings Involving Sensitive Cases,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Witness Data, Ongoing Criminal Investigations, Judicial Proceedings Involving Sensitive Cases,

Entry Point: Unpatched Vulnerabilities In Case Management System,
Reconnaissance Period: Potentially years (hackers may have 'lurked in systems for years')
High Value Targets: Sealed Criminal Cases, National Security Documents,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Sealed Criminal Cases, National Security Documents,

Entry Point: Helpdesk password reset requests
Reconnaissance Period: Ongoing since at least May 2022
Backdoors Established: Yes (compromised administrative accounts)
High Value Targets: Federal Court Personnel Data, Subpoenas, Financial Services Customer Data,
Data Sold on Dark Web: Federal Court Personnel Data, Subpoenas, Financial Services Customer Data,

Corrective Actions: Implementing secure stand-alone computer systems for sensitive documents

Corrective Actions: Strengthening cybersecurity measures

Root Causes: Outdated And Unpatched Software (Us Court Systems)., Lack Of Segmentation In Critical Infrastructure Networks (Norway)., Insufficient Monitoring Of Anomalous Access Patterns (Both Incidents)., Geopolitical Tensions Enabling State-Sponsored Cyber Operations.,

Root Causes: Failure To Remediate Known Vulnerabilities (Since 2019)., Insufficient Logging For Attack Reconstruction., Lack Of **Defense-In-Depth** Strategies For Critical Judicial Systems., Potential **Supply Chain Risks** In Cm/Ecf Software.,
Corrective Actions: Emergency Vulnerability Assessments Across All Federal Court Systems., Deployment Of **Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr)** Tools., Reevaluation Of **Third-Party Vendor Security** For Cm/Ecf., Development Of A **Federal Judicial Cybersecurity Task Force**.,

Root Causes: Systemic Vulnerabilities In Federal Cybersecurity Infrastructure, Lack Of Centralized Incident Response Coordination, Insufficient Proactive Threat Detection, Over-Reliance On Reactive Measures ('Education-By-Breach'), Underestimation Of Non-State Actors (E.G., Drug Cartels) As Cyber Threats,
Corrective Actions: Proposed 'Coordinated Security Uplift' For Federal Agencies, Development Of Shared Incident Case Studies, Enhanced Monitoring For Prolonged Intrusions, Reevaluation Of Offensive Cyber Operations’ Role In Defense, Improved Collaboration Between Judicial, Law Enforcement, And Intelligence Agencies,

Root Causes: Failure To Patch Known Vulnerabilities For ~5 Years., Inadequate Multifactor Authentication (Non-Phishing-Resistant)., Lack Of Mandatory Cybersecurity Requirements For The Judiciary., Culture Of Secrecy/Cover-Up (E.G., Undisclosed 2020 Breach)., Slow Response To Escalating Threats (E.G., 2020 And 2024 Intrusions By Same Actors).,

Root Causes: Inadequate Authentication For Helpdesk Password Resets, Lack Of Mfa For Administrative Accounts, Insufficient Monitoring Of Privileged Account Activity, Human Error (Falling For Social Engineering),
Corrective Actions: Doj/Fbi Disruption Of Scattered Spider Operations (Server Seizures, Arrests), Heightened Scrutiny Of Helpdesk Processes In Federal Agencies, International Law Enforcement Collaboration To Track Cryptocurrency And Threat Actors,
Post-Incident Analysis Process: The company's process for conducting post-incident analysis is described as Likely (but not detailed publicly), Recommended As Part Of Proposed 'Coordinated Security Uplift', , Collaboration With Congress, Federal Agencies (Unspecified), , U.K. National Crime Agency, West Midlands Police, City Of London Police, Agencies In Canada, Romania, Australia, And The Netherlands, .
Corrective Actions Taken: The company has taken the following corrective actions based on post-incident analysis: Implementing secure stand-alone computer systems for sensitive documents, Strengthening cybersecurity measures, Emergency Vulnerability Assessments Across All Federal Court Systems., Deployment Of **Endpoint Detection And Response (Edr)** Tools., Reevaluation Of **Third-Party Vendor Security** For Cm/Ecf., Development Of A **Federal Judicial Cybersecurity Task Force**., , Proposed 'Coordinated Security Uplift' For Federal Agencies, Development Of Shared Incident Case Studies, Enhanced Monitoring For Prolonged Intrusions, Reevaluation Of Offensive Cyber Operations’ Role In Defense, Improved Collaboration Between Judicial, Law Enforcement, And Intelligence Agencies, , Doj/Fbi Disruption Of Scattered Spider Operations (Server Seizures, Arrests), Heightened Scrutiny Of Helpdesk Processes In Federal Agencies, International Law Enforcement Collaboration To Track Cryptocurrency And Threat Actors, .
Ransom Payment History: The company has Paid ransoms in the past.
Last Ransom Demanded: The amount of the last ransom demanded was ['$25 million (one victim)', '$36.2 million (another victim)', 'Total: $115 million across all victims'].
Last Attacking Group: The attacking group in the last incident were an Nation-state actors (suspected), Russian State-Sponsored Actors (suspected)Kremlin-Aligned Cyber Groups, Allegedly linked to Russia (unconfirmed)State-sponsored actors (suspected), Latin American Drug Cartels (potential weaponization of data)Multiple Nation-StatesVarious Criminal Groups, Alleged Russian hackers (same group linked to a prior 2020 intrusion), Scattered SpiderThalha Jubair (19, U.K. national)Owen Flowers (18 and U.K. national)Unnamed U.S.-based co-conspirator.
Most Recent Incident Detected: The most recent incident detected was on 2025-07-04.
Most Recent Incident Publicly Disclosed: The most recent incident publicly disclosed was on 2024-07-18.
Highest Financial Loss: The highest financial loss from an incident was $115 million (ransom payments).
Most Significant Data Compromised: The most significant data compromised in an incident were financial information, trade secrets, sales figures, contracts, product plans, , Confidential court documents, identities of confidential informants, sensitive case documents, identities of confidential informants, , sensitive documents, potential exposure of confidential informant identities, , Sealed court documents, Witness identities, US court system blueprints, Midlevel criminal case files (NYC and other jurisdictions), , Sealed court records, Confidential informant identities, Cooperating witness identities, Criminal dockets, Arrest warrants, Sealed indictments, , Witness identities, Details of ongoing criminal investigations, Sensitive unclassified judicial records, , sealed case data, potential national security documents, criminal charging/investigative documents, , Personnel data (names, usernames, telephone numbers), Federal judge subpoenas, Thousands of names, titles, and work locations of U.S. Courts users, Customer account information (requested via financial services provider) and .
Most Significant System Affected: The most significant system affected in an incident were CM/ECFPACER and Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) and US Courts' CM/ECF (Case Management/Electronic Case Files) systemPACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)Bremanger Dam Control Systems (Norway) and Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) systemBackup paper-filing systems (activated as contingency) and Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF)Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) and federal district court case management system and U.S. Federal Court NetworkSeven victim companies (unnamed)Transport for London (2023)47 U.S. entitiesCompanies in insurance, retail, and aviation industries.
Third-Party Assistance in Most Recent Incident: The third-party assistance involved in the most recent incident was collaboration with congress, federal agencies (unspecified), , u.k. national crime agency, west midlands police, city of london police, agencies in canada, romania, australia, and the netherlands, .
Containment Measures in Most Recent Incident: The containment measures taken in the most recent incident were secured its networks, Restricting access to sensitive documents, Stricter access controls, Isolation of affected CM/ECF componentsTransition to manual filings and Seizure of servers and cryptocurrency wallets ($36M)Shutdown of Scattered Spider's Telegram channel.
Most Sensitive Data Compromised: The most sensitive data compromised in a breach were sales figures, contracts, US court system blueprints, criminal charging/investigative documents, Personnel data (names, usernames, telephone numbers), potential exposure of confidential informant identities, Sealed court documents, Arrest warrants, Sealed court records, Sensitive unclassified judicial records, Federal judge subpoenas, Confidential court documents, identities of confidential informants, product plans, Sealed indictments, Details of ongoing criminal investigations, financial information, Midlevel criminal case files (NYC and other jurisdictions), Thousands of names, titles, and work locations of U.S. Courts users, identities of confidential informants, Confidential informant identities, sealed case data, potential national security documents, Witness identities, Criminal dockets, trade secrets, Customer account information (requested via financial services provider), sensitive documents, sensitive case documents and Cooperating witness identities.
Number of Records Exposed in Most Significant Breach: The number of records exposed in the most significant breach was 0.
Highest Ransom Demanded: The highest ransom demanded in a ransomware incident was ['$25 million (one victim)', '$36.2 million (another victim)', 'Total: $115 million across all victims'].
Highest Ransom Paid: The highest ransom paid in a ransomware incident was $115 million (total across all victims).
Most Significant Legal Action: The most significant legal action taken for a regulatory violation was Potential congressional hearings, Internal judicial reviews, , Sen. Wyden's call for independent review by National Academy of Sciences, , U.S. charges against Thalha Jubair (computer fraud, wire fraud, money laundering), Potential extradition from U.K., Up to 95 years in prison if convicted, .
Most Significant Lesson Learned: The most significant lesson learned from past incidents was Collaboration between international law enforcement agencies is vital for disrupting cybercriminal networks.
Most Significant Recommendation Implemented: The most significant recommendation implemented to improve cybersecurity was Public-private partnerships to share threat intelligence on Kremlin-aligned actors., International cooperation on attributing and deterring state-sponsored cyber operations., Mandate phishing-resistant multifactor authentication across all federal court systems., Address the root causes of systemic vulnerabilities in federal IT infrastructure., Accelerate patch management for critical vulnerabilities in case management systems., Implement stricter identity verification for helpdesk password resets (e.g., MFA, challenge questions)., Monitor administrative accounts for unusual activity (e.g., sudden data access or exfiltration)., Disclose details of the 2020 intrusion and other past breaches to restore accountability., Coordinate with law enforcement proactively to share threat intelligence., Conduct an independent cybersecurity audit (e.g., by National Academy of Sciences)., Consolidation of fragmented IT systems (e.g., US courts' local instances) to reduce attack surface., Mandatory multi-factor authentication for sensitive legal and infrastructure systems., Enhance monitoring and detection capabilities for prolonged intrusions., Enhance logging and monitoring of critical systems to detect unauthorized access., Mandatory **third-party audits** of court IT infrastructure., Implement mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary (currently voluntary)., Implementation of **zero-trust architecture** for federal judicial systems., Develop and share incident case studies to proactively address threats., Implement a 'coordinated security uplift' across federal agencies., Segment networks to limit lateral movement by attackers., Enhanced **insider threat monitoring** for sensitive case files., Immediate patching of all known vulnerabilities in CM/ECF., Replace PACER with a more cyber-secure system, Public disclosure protocols to improve transparency post-breach., Move beyond reactive measures to predictive, intelligence-driven cybersecurity., Train employees on recognizing social engineering tactics, especially for helpdesk staff., Immediate patching of legacy systems in judicial and critical infrastructure sectors., Conduct regular audits of third-party vendors and service providers for security vulnerabilities., Enhanced monitoring of industrial control systems for anomalous behavior (e.g. and dam valve changes)..
Most Recent Source: The most recent source of information about an incident are BleepingComputer, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts public statement, Westminster Magistrates Court Records (Thalha Jubair and Owen Flowers), Sen. Ron Wyden's letter to Chief Justice John Roberts, Lawfare, The Register, The New York Times, Norwegian PST (via local media), 2020 House Judiciary Chair Jerrold Nadler disclosure (referenced by Wyden), FBI Statement (Brett Leatherman), Politico, New York Times, Hunter Strategy (Jake Williams, former NSA hacker) and U.S. Department of Justice.
Most Recent URL for Additional Resources: The most recent URL for additional resources on cybersecurity best practices is https://www.theregister.com, https://www.nytimes.com, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/06/federal-courts-hack-russia-00172345, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/06/us/politics/federal-courts-hack-russia.html, https://www.lawfareblog.com/drug-cartels-are-new-apts .
Current Status of Most Recent Investigation: The current status of the most recent investigation is Ongoing.
Most Recent Stakeholder Advisory: The most recent stakeholder advisory issued was US legal community warned of potential compromise of sealed cases., Norwegian critical infrastructure operators advised to audit control systems., Judicial Conference of the United States (internal), Department of Justice (likely involved), Federal judiciary branches, U.S. Department of Justice, Congressional oversight committees, Law enforcement agencies involved in affected cases, DOJ and FBI warnings about Scattered Spider tactics, Advisories to critical infrastructure sectors, .
Most Recent Customer Advisory: The most recent customer advisory issued were an Lawyers using CM/ECF/PACER advised to monitor for unusual activity.Norwegian public reassured that dam attack caused no lasting damage but demonstrated vulnerability., None publicly issued to affected individuals (e.g., informants/witnesses) and Legal professionals using CM/ECF and PACERWitnesses and individuals involved in compromised cases.
Most Recent Entry Point: The most recent entry point used by an initial access broker were an Exploited unpatched vulnerabilities in CM/ECF system (2019-era flaws) and Helpdesk password reset requests.
Most Recent Reconnaissance Period: The most recent reconnaissance period for an incident was Years-long (US court system)Unspecified (Norway, but part of a 'change in activity over the past year'), Unknown (potentially years, given 2020 breach history), Potentially extended (some actors maintained access for prolonged periods), Potentially years (hackers may have 'lurked in systems for years'), Ongoing since at least May 2022.
Most Significant Root Cause: The most significant root cause identified in post-incident analysis was Outdated and unpatched software (US court systems).Lack of segmentation in critical infrastructure networks (Norway).Insufficient monitoring of anomalous access patterns (both incidents).Geopolitical tensions enabling state-sponsored cyber operations., Failure to remediate known vulnerabilities (since 2019).Insufficient logging for attack reconstruction.Lack of **defense-in-depth** strategies for critical judicial systems.Potential **supply chain risks** in CM/ECF software., Systemic vulnerabilities in federal cybersecurity infrastructureLack of centralized incident response coordinationInsufficient proactive threat detectionOver-reliance on reactive measures ('education-by-breach')Underestimation of non-state actors (e.g., drug cartels) as cyber threats, Failure to patch known vulnerabilities for ~5 years.Inadequate multifactor authentication (non-phishing-resistant).Lack of mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the judiciary.Culture of secrecy/cover-up (e.g., undisclosed 2020 breach).Slow response to escalating threats (e.g., 2020 and 2024 intrusions by same actors)., Inadequate authentication for helpdesk password resetsLack of MFA for administrative accountsInsufficient monitoring of privileged account activityHuman error (falling for social engineering).
Most Significant Corrective Action: The most significant corrective action taken based on post-incident analysis was Implementing secure stand-alone computer systems for sensitive documents, Strengthening cybersecurity measures, Emergency vulnerability assessments across all federal court systems.Deployment of **endpoint detection and response (EDR)** tools.Reevaluation of **third-party vendor security** for CM/ECF.Development of a **federal judicial cybersecurity task force**., Proposed 'coordinated security uplift' for federal agenciesDevelopment of shared incident case studiesEnhanced monitoring for prolonged intrusionsReevaluation of offensive cyber operations’ role in defenseImproved collaboration between judicial, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, DOJ/FBI disruption of Scattered Spider operations (server seizures, arrests)Heightened scrutiny of helpdesk processes in federal agenciesInternational law enforcement collaboration to track cryptocurrency and threat actors.
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A vulnerability has been found in TykoDev cherry-studio-TykoFork 0.1. This issue affects the function redirectToAuthorization of the file /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server of the component OAuth Server Discovery. Such manipulation of the argument authorizationUrl leads to os command injection. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
A flaw has been found in code-projects Question Paper Generator up to 1.0. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /selectquestionuser.php. This manipulation of the argument subid causes sql injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been published and may be used.
A vulnerability was found in alokjaiswal Hotel-Management-services-using-MYSQL-and-php up to 5f8b60a7aa6c06a5632de569d4e3f6a8cd82f76f. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file /dishsub.php. The manipulation of the argument item.name results in cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. This product takes the approach of rolling releases to provide continious delivery. Therefore, version details for affected and updated releases are not available. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
A vulnerability has been found in alokjaiswal Hotel-Management-services-using-MYSQL-and-php up to 5f8b60a7aa6c06a5632de569d4e3f6a8cd82f76f. Affected is an unknown function of the file /usersub.php of the component Request Pending Page. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
A flaw has been found in Verysync 微力同步 up to 2.21.3. This impacts an unknown function of the file /rest/f/api/resources/f96956469e7be39d/tmp/text.txt?override=false of the component Web Administration Module. Executing manipulation can lead to unrestricted upload. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

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